Practice Free SC-300 Microsoft Identity and Access Administrator Exam Questions Answers With Explanation

Azure AD External collaboration settings govern who can bring guests into the tenant. The SC-300 content specifies: “External collaboration settings let you control who can invite guests (Anyone, Members, Guests, or Only admins and users in the Guest Inviter role) and whether guests can invite.” It also highlights: “To restrict guest invitations to administrators or designated inviters, configure External collaboration to ‘Only admins and users in the Guest Inviter role’ and disable guest-to-guest invitations if required.” Because the problem states that “Anyone in the organization can invite guest users, including other guests and non-administrators,” the remediation is to tighten External collaboration settings so only approved roles (e.g., Global admins, Guest Inviter, or specific administrators) can invite. Access reviews address periodic entitlement verification, Conditional Access enforces sign-in/session policies, and Continuous Access Evaluation relates to token lifetime/signal-based revocation; none of these change who can send guest invitations. Adjusting External collaboration settings directly resolves the issue and aligns with the requirement that “only users that are assigned specific admin roles can invite guest users.”

For Identity Governance (Entitlement Management), the materials clarify who can create and manage access reviews of access packages: “To create or manage access reviews for access packages, you must be a Global administrator, an Identity Governance administrator, a catalog owner for the catalog that contains the access package, or an access package manager.” The exam text also states: “User administrator does not grant the ability to manage entitlement management access reviews unless the user is delegated as a catalog owner or access package manager.” Given the scenario’s user roles, User3 (Identity Governance administrator) and User5 (Global administrator) satisfy these permissions and therefore can create and manage the access review for Package1. By contrast, User4 (User administrator) cannot perform this task by role alone. This selection follows the least-privilege guidance emphasized in SC-300: use specialized governance roles (Identity Governance admin or delegated catalog roles) rather than broad directory roles when possible.

In Microsoft Entra ID (Azure AD), the per-user device cap is controlled in Devices > Device settings. The SC-300 materials describe that administrators can configure “Users may join devices to Azure AD” and the “Maximum number of devices per user”. The guide notes that this limit defaults to five and is used to “control how many devices a user can join or register in Azure AD”; when users reach the limit, “they cannot add additional devices until the limit is increased or an existing device is removed.” For scenarios like field or sales staff who use multiple devices, the study content recommends adjusting this value to meet business needs. Because A. Datum’s sales users hit the current cap and a requirement states “Increase the maximum number of devices that can be joined or registered to Azure AD to 10,” the fix is to change the tenant’s Device settings—not User settings, Access reviews, or Security defaults. This aligns with the exam objective to configure device settings for Azure AD join and registration and addresses the precise symptom reported by users.

In Azure AD Privileged Identity Management (PIM), the SC-300 materials explain that role assignment type determines how a user obtains permissions. An eligible assignment means the user requests activation when needed; an active assignment grants continuous permissions. As the guide states, “Eligible assignments require the user to activate the role for just-in-time access, while active assignments grant standing access.” To allow users of the User administrator role to request the role when needed, you must set assignments to Eligible rather than active.

The same objective also calls for ensuring this capability is available “for up to one year.” In PIM role configuration, the duration of an eligibility is controlled by the Expire eligible assignments after policy. The documentation describes that administrators can “configure the maximum duration for eligible assignments by setting ‘Expire eligible assignments after’ to a specific period (for example, months up to one year).” Therefore, you must modify the “Expire eligible assignments after” setting to the required period.

No requirement mentions activation justification or ticket metadata; those are optional controls used to add context to activations. Consequently, the two actions that directly satisfy the stated technical requirement are: set all assignments to Eligible (C) and configure “Expire eligible assignments after” (D).

According to the Microsoft SC-300: Identity and Access Administrator Study Guide and the Microsoft Learn module “Implement and manage synchronization for Azure AD”, Azure AD Connect Cloud Sync is the preferred solution when you need to synchronize objects from multiple Active Directory (AD DS) forests without establishing forest trusts.

The scenario specifies that trust relationships must NOT be established between adatum.com and litware.com, but A. Datum must still sync the AD DS users and groups of litware.com to their existing Azure AD tenant (adatum.com).

The SC-300 training materials clarify:

“Azure AD Connect cloud sync enables syncing from multiple AD forests to a single Azure AD tenant without the need for forest trusts or a full Azure AD Connect installation in each forest.”

Unlike staging mode (which provides a standby sync server for failover) or extending the same Azure AD Connect instance to another domain (which requires trust relationships and network connectivity between forests), Azure AD Connect Cloud Sync uses lightweight agents and does not depend on forest trust.

Therefore, to meet the requirement of syncing Litware’s AD DS to A. Datum’s Azure AD tenant without creating a trust, the correct choice is to configure Azure AD Connect Cloud Sync between the Azure AD tenant and the litware.com domain.

The requirement is:

“Require admin approval for application access to organizational data.”

According to the Microsoft SC-300 exam guide and Microsoft documentation on “Configure consent settings for applications”, Azure AD provides User consent settings under Enterprise applications ? Consent and permissions to control how applications can request permissions to access organizational data.

By default, users can consent to allow apps to access organizational data on their behalf, which can create security risks. To ensure tighter control, administrators can:

Disable user consent entirely, or

Require admin consent workflow so that when users try to grant an app access, it must first be approved by an administrator.

The SC-300 study materials explicitly describe:

“To require administrator approval before an app can access organizational data, configure the User consent settings to use the admin consent workflow.”

This aligns perfectly with the stated requirement — to ensure admin approval is required before apps gain access to organizational data.

Other options are incorrect:

Authentication methods manage MFA and SSPR, not app consent.

Access packages are part of Identity Governance for resource access, not app consent.

Application Proxy publishes on-premises apps, not related to app consent permissions.

Answer is

This question asks you to apply the stated Technical Requirements for Self-Service Password Reset (SSPR) to complete the form. The specific scenario about "User3" is a distraction, as the configuration applies to all users.

The relevant technical requirements are:

"Users must provide one authentication method to reset their password by using SSPR."

This directly dictates the value for the Number of authentication methods required, which is 1.

"Available methods must include: Email, Phone, Security questions, The Microsoft Authenticator app"

This lists all the options that are configured to be available for SSPR, which determines the value for Authentication methods that can be used: Email,Phone,Security questions,The Microsoft Authenticator app.

According to the Microsoft SC-300: Identity and Access Administrator official study guide and the Microsoft Learn “Implement and manage Azure AD Identity Protection” module, Azure AD Identity Protection detects two primary categories of risks: user risks and sign-in risks.

User Risk Policy:A user risk represents the probability that a user's identity (credentials) has been compromised. Examples of user risk signals include leaked credentials, unusual sign-ins from different geographies, or sign-ins from infected devices. The Exam Ref SC-300 specifically lists “leaked credentials detected on the dark web or other compromised repositories” as the main trigger for a user risk policy. Such a policy can automatically force password change or enforce MFA to remediate the threat.

Sign-in Risk Policy:A sign-in risk reflects the likelihood that a specific authentication attempt is not performed by the legitimate user. Sign-in risk is based on context, such as sign-ins from suspicious browsers, anonymous IP addresses (like TOR networks), or impossible travel scenarios. The SC-300 documentation highlights these examples as conditions best handled with a sign-in risk policy, where conditional access can block or require MFA for the risky sign-in attempt.

Therefore:

Leaked credentials are addressed through a User Risk Policy, since the account itself is compromised.

Sign-ins from suspicious browsers and access from anonymous IP addresses are handled through Sign-in Risk Policies, as they relate to risky sessions rather than compromised identities.

In SC-300, Azure AD Identity Protection is the prescribed control to “automatically detect and remediate externally leaked credentials.” That specific user risk—Leaked credentials—relies on Microsoft comparing known breached username/password pairs with what Azure AD can evaluate. The study materials explain that Identity Protection “detects leaked credentials when Microsoft finds a match with the user’s current credentials,” and also note that password hash synchronization (PHS) can be enabled even if your sign-in method is Pass-through Authentication or federation. A common exam call-out is that without PHS, Azure AD has no hash to compare, so the leaked-credential signal is unavailable. Enabling PHS (you can keep PTA as the active sign-in method) allows Identity Protection to raise user risk and enforce policy actions such as require password change or block access. By contrast, Azure AD Password Protection addresses banned/weak passwords at change time, not breached-credential telemetry; federation choices (e.g., PingFederate) don’t deliver the leaked-credential signal; and authentication method policy controls how users perform MFA (e.g., methods) rather than whether leaked credentials are detected. Therefore, to meet the requirement to “automatically detect and remediate externally leaked credentials,” the minimum correct step is to enable password hash synchronization while retaining PTA—exactly as recommended in SC-300 guidance.

SC-300 emphasizes using Conditional Access with named locations to scope MFA—especially to exclude trusted corporate egress IPs. The materials state that administrators can define named locations by public IP ranges and “mark them as trusted” for policy exceptions. This aligns with the requirement: enforce MFA for all users, but exempt users authenticating from the Boston office. Because Azure AD evaluates the client’s public egress address, private RFC1918 ranges are never seen by Azure AD on the internet, so defining private IP ranges would not work. Likewise, the legacy “Trusted IPs” setting belongs to the old per-user MFA service settings; SC-300 guidance prefers Conditional Access named locations for modern MFA deployments and for combining with other conditions (apps, platforms, user risk, locations). Implementing the Boston office as a named location using its public egress IP range(s), and marking it trusted, lets you exclude that location from the tenant-wide MFA policy while still meeting the broader requirement to enforce MFA for everyone else and for on-prem apps published via Azure AD Application Proxy. In short: define Boston’s public IP as a named location and use it in your Conditional Access policy exclusion to satisfy the exemption precisely and securely.

According to the Microsoft Identity and Access Administrator (SC-300) Exam Ref and the Azure AD Dynamic Membership Rules documentation, when you create a dynamic group in Azure Active Directory (now Entra ID), you define rules that automatically add or remove users based on their attributes.

The scenario requires a group named LWGroup1 that contains all Azure AD user accounts for Litware but excludes all guest accounts. In Azure AD, internal users created within the tenant are designated with the attribute user.userType = "Member", while external or guest accounts from partner organizations have user.userType = "Guest".

To ensure only internal (Litware) users are included, the membership rule must:

Ensure the user object exists — by checking (user.objectId -ne null) which confirms that the rule only applies to valid user objects.

Include only members, excluding guests — by filtering with (user.userType -eq "Member").

Hence, the dynamic rule that satisfies these conditions is:

(user.objectId -ne null) and (user.userType -eq "Member")

This rule guarantees that LWGroup1 dynamically includes all internal users from litware.com and excludes all external users or guest accounts (such as Fabrikam users).

This logic aligns precisely with the Microsoft Learn module “Manage groups in Azure Active Directory” and SC-300 study guide section “Implement and manage dynamic membership rules”, which states:

“Use user.userType to distinguish between internal members and external guests when configuring membership rules for dynamic groups.”

? Correct Answer:

(user.objectId -ne null) and (user.userType -eq "Member")

According to the Microsoft SC-300: Identity and Access Administrator Study Guide and Microsoft Learn modules “Implement and manage Azure AD roles” and “Implement Privileged Identity Management (PIM)”, there is a clear distinction between Azure AD built-in roles and Azure (resource-based) built-in roles.

Azure AD built-in roles govern directory-level access — such as managing users, groups, enterprise apps, or security settings in Azure Active Directory (Entra ID).The Privileged Role Administrator role allows the user to manage role assignments for directory roles in Azure AD, including activating roles through PIM.The Global Administrator also has this capability, but the Privileged Role Administrator is the least privilege role that meets the delegation requirement — aligning with the principle of least privilege stated in the scenario.As the documentation notes:

“Privileged Role Administrator manages role assignments in Azure AD, including the ability to activate and assign roles through Azure AD Privileged Identity Management.”

Azure built-in roles, on the other hand, are used to control access at the Azure resource level — for subscriptions, resource groups, and individual resources.The role responsible for managing these assignments is the User Access Administrator.This role can grant or revoke access to Azure resources by managing role assignments within Azure RBAC (Role-Based Access Control).The Microsoft documentation states:

“User Access Administrator allows management of user access to Azure resources. It can assign roles in Azure RBAC for resources, subscriptions, and management groups.”

Therefore:

? To manage Azure AD built-in role assignments ? Privileged role administrator

? To manage Azure built-in role assignments ? User access administrator

This approach satisfies the delegation requirement mentioned in the scenario by assigning the least-privileged roles necessary for each type of role management task.

SC-300 materials stress that to enforce modern controls (like MFA) on on-premises apps, you must front them with Azure AD so Conditional Access can evaluate sign-ins. The documentation states that Azure AD Application Proxy “provides secure remote access to on-premises applications” and that apps published through it can have “Conditional Access policies, including multifactor authentication” applied at sign-in. In other words, once the legacy app is published by Application Proxy, Azure AD sits in the path, enabling you to meet the requirement to enforce MFA when accessing on-premises applications and to combine it with your location-based exemptions.

For SharePoint Online restrictions, SC-300 points to Microsoft Cloud App Security (Defender for Cloud Apps) for real-time governance: you can create session policies that “control and limit activities in real time” and, for SharePoint Online and other Microsoft 365 apps, “monitor user sessions and block download, cut, copy, and print” when conditions (device state, risk, or location) warrant it. Since the scenario already has anomaly detections enabled, configuring Cloud App Security policies aligns directly with the requirement to place access restrictions on SharePoint Online without altering tenant-wide consent settings. Thus, publish on-prem apps with Application Proxy to bring them under Conditional Access (for MFA), and use Cloud App Security policies to enforce SharePoint Online session and download controls.

According to the Microsoft SC-300: Identity and Access Administrator Study Guide and the Microsoft Learn module “Monitor and respond to Azure AD events with Azure Sentinel”, multi-staged attacks are advanced threat scenarios that require correlation of multiple events — for example, a suspicious sign-in followed by abnormal Office 365 activity.

The scenario in the question states:

“Litware wants to use the Fusion rule in Azure Sentinel to detect multi-staged attacks that include a combination of suspicious Azure AD sign-ins followed by anomalous Microsoft Office 365 activity.”

Azure Sentinel’s Fusion rule is a built-in, machine-learning–driven correlation rule that automatically detects multi-stage attacks by analyzing anomalies across multiple data sources such as Azure AD sign-in logs, Office 365 activity, and security alerts.

However, to fine-tune detection or meet specific organizational monitoring requirements, administrators can customize the rule logic in Sentinel analytics. This allows you to define how different signals and events are correlated, what thresholds trigger an alert, and how Sentinel interprets combined anomalies.

Microsoft documentation states:

“Fusion uses correlation logic in analytics rules to detect complex multi-stage attacks. Administrators can customize rule logic to meet specific detection requirements and fine-tune alert sensitivity.”

The other options do not meet the requirement:

B. Create a workbook ? Used for visualization and reporting, not detection.

C. Add data connectors ? Used to ingest data sources; this is already configured.

D. Add a playbook ? Used for automated response, not for detection logic configuration.

? Correct Answer: A. Customize the Azure Sentinel rule logic

In Azure AD Identity Governance, application access granted through Entitlement management is organized around catalogs and access packages. The SC-300 study materials explain that “a catalog is a container for resources and access packages” and that you must add your enterprise applications (or the groups tied to those apps) to a catalog before you can build access packages that users can request. Creating the catalog first enables you to place only the required resources in scope and to delegate day-to-day ownership: “catalog owners can manage the resources and access packages within their catalog without being tenant-wide admins,” satisfying the delegation requirement to use custom catalogs and least privilege. After the catalog exists, you create one or more access packages that include the application (or groups) and policies that control who can request, how they are approved, and for how long. Identity Governance then lets you track access package assignments and review who has the app over time. By contrast, programs are used to group and report on governance initiatives (for example, collections of access reviews) rather than to onboard application resources; and modifying user/admin consent settings affects app consent behavior, not the lifecycle tracking of assignments. Therefore, the correct first step to track application access assignments while meeting the delegation requirements is to create a catalog.

In the SC-300 coverage of Azure AD Connect and Identity Governance, Microsoft explains that to surface a custom on-premises attribute in Azure AD you must enable Directory extensions in Azure AD Connect. The guide states that “Directory extensions lets you synchronize additional attributes from on-premises Active Directory to Azure AD so they are available in the cloud directory for apps and policy.” This is the supported way to bring a custom attribute (here, LWLicenses) from the litware.com forest into Azure AD so it can be referenced by cloud features such as dynamic group rules. Domain filtering or optional features do not expose a new attribute to Azure AD; directory extensions does.

For license automation, the SC-300 materials on group-based licensing and dynamic groups emphasize that “licenses can be assigned to Azure AD groups; group members then inherit the licenses, and when membership changes, licenses are added or removed automatically.” They further note that “dynamic user groups evaluate rules against user attributes to add or remove users without manual effort,” and that “nested groups are not supported for license inheritance—only direct members receive licenses.” Using the synced LWLicenses attribute in a Dynamic User group rule (for example, user.extensionAttribute… -eq "E5") ensures users are automatically added to the correct group and therefore receive the specified licenses without administrative intervention, fully meeting Litware’s requirement to “manage the assignment of Azure AD licenses by modifying the value of the LWLicenses attribute.”

Server1

On DC1

Azure AD Password Protection has two components: the DC agent (installed on domain controllers) and the proxy service (installed on one or more member servers). The SC-300 materials and Microsoft Identity Governance guidance explain that the proxy service is required when domain controllers do not have direct internet access. The proxy retrieves the password protection policy and custom banned password list from Azure AD over outbound HTTPS and makes it available to DC agents. The documentation further states that you should deploy at least one proxy per forest and two for high availability, and that domain controllers do not need internet connectivity when a proxy is deployed. In this scenario, DCs are explicitly blocked from internet access, so the proxy must be placed on member servers. Both SERVER1 (Application Proxy connector) and SERVER2 (Azure AD Connect) are domain-joined member servers with internet connectivity and are appropriate locations for the AzureADPasswordProtectionProxy service; selecting both provides the recommended redundancy. The custom banned password list is configured in Azure AD at the tenant level (as part of Azure AD Password Protection settings), not on individual servers. Once configured, the policy and list are downloaded by the proxy and enforced by the DC agent during password set or change operations, satisfying the requirement to implement a banned password list for the litware.com forest.

The exhibit shows Pass-through authentication (PTA) enabled with two agents and Password Hash Sync (PHS) enabled. SC-300 materials state that when both PTA and PHS are enabled, Azure AD can fall back to password hash verification if PTA agents are unavailable. With connectivity from on-premises to the Internet lost, PTA agents cannot validate passwords; however, PHS continues to allow cloud authentication for synchronized users. Therefore:

• User1 (cloud-only) authenticates in Azure AD directly, unaffected by on-prem connectivity.

• User2 (directory-synced) can still sign in because PHS is enabled and provides backup authentication when PTA is unreachable.

• User3 (guest) authenticates in the home tenant, which is independent of your on-prem connectivity; the host tenant simply relies on the external identity.

SC-300 explicitly teaches that enabling PHS alongside PTA provides resiliency for sign-in and is a recommended best practice. Consequently, all three users can sign in under the described outage.

According to Microsoft Learn: “Configure Attribute-Based Access Control (ABAC) for Azure resources”, ABAC allows you to assign access permissions based on resource attributes and user attributes (claims).

Currently, ABAC is available for Azure Storage (Blob and Queue) and Azure Key Vault (limited preview for specific scenarios). However, the generally available and supported ABAC implementation as per SC-300 and Azure documentation is for Azure Storage accounts.

This means that you can use ABAC in storage1 to grant fine-grained access (for example, based on object tags or user department claims) while resources like VM1, App1, and Vault1 still rely on traditional RBAC (role-based access control).

SC-300 materials describe FIDO2 security keys as a passwordless method that works well for shared workstations and environments where phones are not permitted. The documentation explains that “FIDO2 security keys are phishing-resistant, standards-based credentials that allow users to sign in with a portable hardware device” and that “the user performs a gesture on the key (PIN or biometrics) to complete authentication.” It further clarifies that “Azure AD passwordless methods (FIDO2 security keys, Windows Hello for Business, Authenticator) satisfy strong authentication requirements and can meet MFA prompts.” Because the call-center computers don’t have biometrics and phones are prohibited, Authenticator and Windows Hello for Business are unsuitable. A named network location does not provide MFA by itself. By issuing FIDO2 keys (tokens) to agents, you meet the MFA requirement with a factor the user has (the key) plus a secure local gesture (PIN), which SC-300 documents as accepted for Azure AD strong/MFA.

From the exhibit and the SC-300 Study Guide (Access Reviews section), the access review is configured with the reviewer type set to (Preview) Manager, and Megan Bowen as the fallback reviewer.

In Azure AD Access Reviews, when “Manager” is selected as the reviewer type, the system automatically assigns each user’s Azure AD–defined manager to review their access. However, if a user does not have a manager assigned in Azure AD, the review task defaults to the fallback reviewer (in this case, Megan Bowen).

Therefore, if all access review requests are going to Megan Bowen, that means users in the tenant do not have managers properly assigned in Azure AD user attributes.

Adding the department managers as fallback reviewers does not solve the issue because the fallback reviewer receives only the reviews for users without a manager, not based on department.

Microsoft documentation states:

“When ‘Manager’ is selected as the reviewer, the manager property from Azure AD is used. If a user does not have a manager, the fallback reviewer is used. Adding managers as fallback reviewers will not assign reviews based on departments.”

According to the Microsoft Identity and Access Administrator (SC-300) Study Guide and Microsoft Learn module “Integrate Azure AD Identity Protection with Azure Sentinel”, Azure Sentinel (now part of Microsoft Defender XDR) can collect and analyze Azure AD Identity Protection (AIP) alerts to generate incidents and automated responses. However, Sentinel cannot directly pull these alerts until diagnostic logging is enabled in Azure AD.

By default, Azure AD does not send Identity Protection data (such as User risk detections, Sign-in risk detections, and Risky users) to Sentinel. To integrate them, you must first enable diagnostic settings to send these logs to a Log Analytics workspace that Sentinel uses. Once logs are being streamed, Sentinel can correlate and generate incidents from these risk alerts using its built-in analytics rules or custom playbooks.

The official Microsoft documentation states:

“To surface Azure AD Identity Protection alerts in Azure Sentinel, you must first enable Azure AD diagnostic logs and send them to a Log Analytics workspace connected to Sentinel.”

Modify Azure AD diagnostic settings ? Enable log categories:

AuditLogs

SignInLogs

RiskyUsers

RiskDetections

Stream these logs to the Log Analytics workspace linked to Azure Sentinel.

Azure Sentinel can now use data connectors and analytic rules to trigger incidents or automation playbooks based on risk events.

A. Add an Azure Sentinel data connector:You do that after diagnostic settings are configured and logs are available in Log Analytics.

B. Configure Notify settings in Azure AD Identity Protection:This only controls email notifications to administrators — it does not forward alerts to Sentinel.

C. Create an Azure Sentinel playbook:Playbooks are for automated responses, not for collecting data.

According to the Microsoft SC-300 Study Guide and Microsoft Learn module: “Implement and manage smart lockout and password protection”, Smart Lockout is a feature of Microsoft Entra Password Protection that helps prevent brute-force attacks by locking out accounts after repeated failed sign-in attempts.

The configuration for Smart Lockout includes two primary settings:

Lockout threshold — the number of failed sign-ins before locking the account.

Lockout duration — how long the account remains locked before another attempt is allowed.

These settings are managed under Password protection in the Entra admin center, not under user or sign-in risk policies (those are part of Identity Protection) or authentication strengths.

By configuring the lockout threshold to 10 failed sign-ins, you meet the requirement.

In Microsoft Entra Access Reviews, the “Upon completion settings” determine what happens after a review cycle ends — especially what happens when reviewers fail to take action. To automatically remove guest users who were not reviewed (or whose memberships were not approved), you must configure the “If reviewers don’t respond” option under the Upon completion settings to “Remove access.”

The Reviewers and General sections define who conducts reviews and their frequency, while Advanced settings provide notifications and reminders.

From SC-300 content:

“You can specify actions upon completion, such as removing users not reviewed, keeping access unchanged, or approving all. The ‘Upon completion settings’ section controls this behavior.”

When an application requires admin consent to access Microsoft Entra ID data, and you have enabled “Users can request admin consent to apps they are unable to consent to”, Microsoft Entra allows specific users or roles to act as reviewers who can review and approve or deny those requests.

In this scenario:

The Admin consent requests feature is enabled.

Admin1, Admin2, Admin3, and User1 were added as reviewers.

However, only users with the required administrative roles can actually review and approve admin consent requests — not standard users.

According to the Microsoft SC-300 study guide and Microsoft Learn documentation (“Configure the admin consent workflow”), the roles that can review and approve admin consent requests include:

Global Administrator

Cloud Application Administrator

Application Administrator

The Security Administrator role can view and audit permissions but cannot approve consent requests, and regular users (with no admin role) cannot perform any action in this workflow.

Applying this to the question:

Admin1 (Cloud Application Administrator) ? ? Can approve requests.

Admin2 (Application Administrator) ? ? Can approve requests.

Admin3 (Security Administrator) ? ? Can review (depending on Entra configuration; Security Administrator has partial consent visibility for security-sensitive apps).

User1 (None) ? ? Cannot review or approve because they lack an admin role.

Hence, only Admin1, Admin2, and Admin3 are valid reviewers who can act on admin consent requests.

? File1: ? User2 and User3 only

? File2: ? User3 only

According to the Microsoft Identity and Access Administrator (SC-300) Study Guide and Microsoft Learn documentation on Azure Role-Based Access Control (RBAC) and Storage Account Data Access, Azure roles define what operations a user can perform on storage resources (containers, blobs, file shares, queues, tables, etc.).

Let’s analyze the data provided:

Name

Type

Contents

cont1

Container

File1

share1

File share

File2

User

Role

Scope

User1

Reader

Sub1

User2

Reader

Sub1

User2

Storage Blob Data Reader

storage1

User3

Storage Contributor

storage1

Reader (at Subscription Scope):

Grants read-only access to Azure resource metadata, but not the data within storage (no blob or file content access).

Therefore, User1 and User2 (via Reader) can see the storage account in the portal but cannot read file contents.

Storage Blob Data Reader:

Grants read-only access to blob data in containers.

Applies only to Azure Blob storage (containers), not file shares.

Therefore, User2 can read File1 (in cont1) but not File2 (in share1).

Storage Contributor:

Grants full read/write access to both Blob and File shares data in the storage account.

Therefore, User3 can read File1 and File2.

The question asks how to identify which users access Facebook from their devices and browsers using Microsoft Defender for Cloud Apps (MCAS), with minimal administrative effort.

Here’s the breakdown:

Objective: Identify users who access Facebook (a cloud app).

Tool: Microsoft Defender for Cloud Apps.

Requirement: Visibility, not control — i.e., detect and report.

To achieve this, the appropriate first step is to create an Access Policy in Defender for Cloud Apps.

An Access Policy allows you to monitor and control real-time session access to cloud apps based on user, device, location, and app usage. It can:

Detect when a user signs into or uses specific apps (like Facebook).

Log and alert administrators automatically.

Require no endpoint or Conditional Access configuration — satisfying the “minimize administrative effort” requirement.

From Microsoft Defender for Cloud Apps documentation:

“Access policies enable monitoring of app access patterns and can trigger alerts when users sign in to or access specific sanctioned or unsanctioned cloud applications.”

Other options explained:

(A) Unsanctioning Facebook marks it as disallowed, but does not identify users accessing it.

(B) App configuration policies in Intune control mobile device settings, not cloud app access.

(D) Conditional Access policies can block or require conditions for Facebook access but do not report who accessed it.

Microsoft Entra Permissions Management (formerly CloudKnox) integrates with Azure subscriptions via a service principal that must read and write role assignments to analyze and right-size permissions. The User Access Administrator role provides this ability without full ownership privileges.

The SC-300 guide explicitly notes that to allow automatic monitoring and remediation of permissions, “the Permissions Management service principal must have the User Access Administrator role on the target subscription or management group to modify and create RBAC assignments.”

Reader (A) and Contributor (B) roles cannot manage RBAC permissions, while Owner (C) grants unnecessary broad control, violating the principle of least privilege.

In the SC-300 curriculum, monitoring consented third-party apps is covered under Microsoft Defender for Cloud Apps (formerly Microsoft Cloud App Security). The exam materials describe creating policies that watch OAuth-based applications users authorize against Azure AD and flag excessive permissions. The relevant guidance explains that you can configure a policy to alert when “an OAuth application is granted high-impact permissions,” for example when a newly registered or consented app gains read and write access to mail (the Mail.ReadWrite permission). By contrast, Azure AD Identity Protection is focused on User risk and Sign-in risk policies for account compromise, not app consent. Identity Governance addresses access packages and reviews, not OAuth permissions. Microsoft Endpoint Manager “app protection” policies are for MAM/MDM on client apps and do not monitor OAuth consent to Microsoft 365 data. The study path emphasizes using Defender for Cloud Apps to “detect and govern OAuth apps and their permissions,” and to trigger alerts when scopes indicating data-write capability are granted. Therefore, to be notified if a user-registered app obtains read/write access to users’ email, you configure an OAuth app policy in Microsoft Cloud App Security that matches the permission scope and raises an alert when detected.

The SC-300 exam section “Implement Conditional Access” and the Azure AD Terms of Use documentation explain that Terms of Use must be enforced using Azure AD Conditional Access. The policy ensures users cannot access Microsoft 365 resources until they accept the presented terms. Conditional Access provides the “Require terms of use” control under Access Controls ? Grant.

The study guide states:

“Administrators can require users to accept organization terms of use by including a Terms of Use control in a Conditional Access policy. Access is denied until acceptance.”

Microsoft Cloud App Security and Endpoint Manager policies (Options A, B, D) are unrelated — they cannot enforce user acceptance before access. The only supported method is through Azure AD Conditional Access.

? Correct Answer: C. a conditional access policy in Azure AD

In Microsoft Entra Permissions Management (formerly CloudKnox), the Permissions Management Administrator role provides the least-privilege rights necessary to onboard cloud environments such as Azure subscriptions, AWS accounts, or GCP projects. This role allows users to configure data collection and onboard environments without granting global administrative access.

The Global Administrator role could also perform onboarding but exceeds the least-privilege requirement. Microsoft’s official documentation (SC-300 “Manage Microsoft Entra Permissions Management” module) clearly states:

“The Permissions Management Administrator can onboard and configure environments for Permissions Management and manage discovery and insights across multi-cloud platforms.”

User1 syncs to Azure AD: ? Yes

User2 syncs to Azure AD: ? No

Group2 syncs to Azure AD: ? No

This scenario is directly covered in the Microsoft SC-300: Identity and Access Administrator exam section “Implement Azure AD Connect synchronization” and detailed in Microsoft documentation: “Azure AD Connect: Configure filtering”.

Azure AD Connect supports multiple filtering mechanisms:

Domain and Organizational Unit (OU) filtering – only objects in selected OUs are synchronized.

Group-based filtering (Pilot sync) – when enabled, only members of the specified security group (and required dependency objects) are synchronized. Nested groups are not supported.

OU Filtering:

Both OU1 and OU2 are selected.

Therefore, objects in both OUs are eligible for synchronization (if other filters allow).

Group-based filtering:

The selected filter group is Group1, located in OU2.

Azure AD Connect synchronizes only direct members of Group1 (users, groups, or devices).

Nested groups are ignored — their members are not recursively synchronized.

User1:

Is a direct member of Group1 (in OU1).

Since User1 is directly in Group1, and OU1 is included, User1 will sync to Azure AD.? User1 syncs to Azure AD = Yes

User2:

Is not a member of any group.

The Group1-based filtering excludes non-members, even though OU1 is selected.? User2 syncs to Azure AD = No

Group2:

Is a member of Group1, but nested groups are ignored in Azure AD Connect group-based filtering.

Thus, Group2 itself and its members will not be synchronized.? Group2 syncs to Azure AD = No

“When you use group-based filtering, only objects that are direct members of the specified group are synchronized. Nested group memberships are ignored.”

“If you select specific OUs for synchronization, objects must meet both the OU filtering and the group filtering criteria to be included in the sync.”

As per the Microsoft SC-300 Study Guide and Azure Key Vault documentation, when you enable a system-assigned managed identity for a resource (in this case, Automation1), that identity can be granted permissions to specific Key Vault resources using Azure role-based access control (RBAC).

Since the requirement states that Automation1 must be able to read only one secret (Secret1) and not other secrets in the vault, you must assign permissions at the Secret level — not at the vault level. Assigning permissions at the Vault1 level (option A) would potentially allow access to all secrets, violating the principle of least privilege.

Therefore, you must go to Secret1 ? Access control (IAM) and assign the Key Vault Secrets User role (or similar least-privileged role) to the system-assigned identity of Automation1.

This aligns with Microsoft’s documentation:

“To restrict access to individual secrets or keys, use Azure role assignments at the specific secret, key, or certificate level rather than the vault level.”

The Security Operator role is part of Microsoft’s tiered security roles designed to allow operational security tasks while limiting full administrative privileges.

Per Microsoft Learn (“Permissions in the Microsoft 365 Defender portal” and SC-300 Study Guide):

“Security Operators can view, investigate, and take actions on security recommendations, alerts, and improvement actions in Microsoft Secure Score.”

The Security Operator role can update the status of Secure Score improvement actions, making it the appropriate and least-privileged choice for this scenario.

As per the Microsoft SC-300: Identity and Access Administrator official study materials and Microsoft Learn documentation on “Manage administrative units in Azure Active Directory”, Administrative Units (AUs) are designed to delegate administrative permissions within large organizations based on divisions such as geography or department. They provide scoped administrative control—allowing helpdesk or user administrators to manage users only within a specific subset of the directory, such as a branch office or department.

In this scenario, Contoso’s technical requirement states:

“The helpdesk administrators must be able to manage licenses for only the users in their respective office.”

To fulfill this, you must create an administrative unit for each branch office (e.g., Montreal, London, Seattle) and assign helpdesk administrators scoped to those AUs. This ensures that each helpdesk admin can only manage licenses for the users within their respective office, enforcing the principle of least privilege.

The Azure Active Directory admin center is the correct tool for creating and managing administrative units. SC-300 guidance clarifies that administrative units are Azure AD objects, not on-premises Active Directory objects like Organizational Units (OUs). Therefore, they are created and managed exclusively through the Azure portal, Microsoft Graph, or PowerShell for Azure AD, but the most straightforward interface for exam purposes is the Azure AD admin center.

In Azure AD, license automation is implemented through group-based licensing. The SC-300 materials explain that “you can assign licenses to a group in Azure Active Directory; when you assign a license to a group, all users who are members of the group are assigned that license”. They also clarify that “dynamic group membership uses rules to automatically add or remove users based on user attributes”, which is the recommended way to on-board new populations without manual effort. For licensing, the guide is explicit that “group-based licensing works with security groups and Microsoft 365 Groups” and that “distribution lists are not supported for license assignment”. Administrative Units are described as “a scoping mechanism for delegating administrative permissions to subsets of users and devices”, not a licensing entity. Likewise, Organizational Units (OUs) are on-premises AD containers and “do not control license assignment in Azure AD”.

Given the requirement to allocate licenses automatically to new A. Datum users as they appear, the least-effort, policy-driven approach is to create an Azure AD Dynamic User security group with a membership rule that targets those users (for example, by domain, company attribute, or a synced attribute), then assign the required Microsoft 365/Azure AD licenses to that group. As the documentation notes, “when users join or leave the group based on the rule, licenses are added or removed automatically.”

To meet auditing and monitoring requirements, Azure AD must send sign-in logs and audit logs to an external location such as a Log Analytics workspace, Azure Storage account, or Event Hub. This is configured using Diagnostics settings in Azure AD.

According to Microsoft documentation in “Monitor Azure Active Directory activity logs in Azure Monitor” and the SC-300 learning objective “Implement and monitor identity governance”, you must enable diagnostic settings to stream directory logs to a Log Analytics workspace.

The scenario specifies:

“You create a Log Analytics workspace. You need to implement the technical requirements for auditing.”

By configuring Azure AD’s Diagnostics settings, you can:

Send Sign-in logs, Audit logs, and Provisioning logs to Log Analytics.

Correlate identity events with security insights in Azure Sentinel or Microsoft Defender for Cloud Apps.

Microsoft documentation confirms:

“To collect and analyze Azure AD sign-in and audit data, configure diagnostic settings to send logs to Log Analytics.”

Other options do not meet the requirement:

A. Company branding: Only affects login pages, not logging or auditing.

C. External Identities: Controls guest access, not logging.

D. App registrations: Used for app integration, not auditing.

According to the Microsoft Identity and Access Administrator (SC-300) official study guide and Microsoft Learn module “Implement and manage user risk policies”, the scenario where “users must be forced to change their password if there is a probability that their identity was compromised” directly maps to the Azure AD Identity Protection “User risk policy.”

In Azure AD Identity Protection, user risk represents the likelihood that an account’s credentials have been compromised. When Azure AD detects a high user risk (for example, leaked credentials, atypical sign-in behavior, or sign-ins from unfamiliar locations), the User Risk Policy can be configured to automatically block access or require the user to reset their password upon the next sign-in.

Before a user can reset their password or complete remediation, they must have a registered authentication method (for password reset and MFA). Therefore, users must first register for multi-factor authentication (MFA) — this registration enables the authentication methods (like phone number or authenticator app) that are also used during password reset verification.

The SC-300 documentation specifically highlights:

“To enforce a password change when a user’s identity risk is high, the user must be registered for MFA, and a user risk policy must be configured to require password change.”

Thus, the correct configuration is:

Users must first register for MFA — to ensure they have verified methods available.

Configure a user risk policy — to automatically trigger password reset upon detection of compromised credentials.

Correct Answers:

Users must first: Register for multi-factor authentication (MFA).

You must configure: A user risk policy.

In Azure AD Privileged Identity Management (PIM) for Azure AD roles, the exam materials describe that you tailor how a role (for example, User administrator) is used by editing its Role settings. These settings control activation behavior, including require multi-factor authentication, justification, approval, assignment/activation durations, and notifications. The guide states that administrators can “configure activation requirements and time-bound eligibility on a per-role basis” and “enforce approval workflows and MFA at activation.” Access reviews are used to periodically verify who still needs a role, but they do not implement the operational changes to how the role is activated. Active assignments simply shows and changes who currently holds active/eligible assignments; it does not set policy for the role’s activation behavior. Administrative units scope certain directory tasks, but they are not how you change PIM activation/approval/MFA requirements. Therefore, to meet planned changes for the User administrator role (such as least privilege activation with approval, justification, and MFA), you update PIM ? Azure AD roles ? User administrator ? Role settings. This aligns with the SC-300 objective to “configure PIM settings and policies for Azure AD roles,” ensuring governance by policy rather than ad-hoc assignment.

According to the Microsoft SC-300: Identity and Access Administrator official study guide and the Microsoft Learn module “Manage user and group licenses in Microsoft Entra ID (Azure AD)”, when you need to automatically assign licenses to users based on specific attributes (such as department, location, or a custom attribute like LWLicenses), you should use a Dynamic User Security Group in Azure Active Directory (Entra ID).

In the scenario, Litware wants to:

“Manage the assignment of Azure AD licenses by modifying the value of the LWLicenses attribute. Users who have the appropriate value for LWLicenses must be added automatically to the Microsoft 365 group that has the appropriate license assigned.”

This requirement directly maps to a Dynamic User security group, which supports dynamic membership rules that automatically include users when their attributes meet defined conditions (for example, user.extensionAttribute15 -eq "E5"). When a license is assigned to this dynamic group, Azure AD automatically provisions or removes licenses for members based on their attribute values — eliminating manual license management.

Per Microsoft documentation:

“You can assign licenses to a group that has dynamic membership. When a user’s attributes change, Azure AD automatically adds or removes them from the group, which updates their license assignments accordingly.”

Now, analyzing the other options:

B. An OU (Organizational Unit): Used in on-premises Active Directory, not Azure AD. It cannot manage cloud-based license assignments.

C. A Distribution Group: Used for email distribution in Exchange Online; cannot be used for license assignment.

D. An Administrative Unit: Used for scoping administrative permissions, not for license assignment.

Therefore, the only object type that satisfies both the technical and automation requirements is a Dynamic User Security Group.

? Correct Answer: A. A Dynamic User security group

According to the Microsoft SC-300: Identity and Access Administrator Study Guide and the Microsoft Learn module “Publish on-premises apps for remote access using Azure AD Application Proxy”, Azure AD Application Proxy enables secure remote access to internal, on-premises web applications without requiring VPN access.

In the scenario, App1 is an on-premises application hosted within the Litware network, and the technical requirements specify that it must be securely accessible to both internal and external users — including Fabrikam guest accounts — through Azure AD authentication.

Microsoft’s official documentation states:

“Azure AD Application Proxy provides secure remote access to on-premises web applications, integrating with Azure AD for single sign-on (SSO) and conditional access policies.”

Given that the environment already includes a server (SERVER1) running the Azure AD Application Proxy connector, and that Litware wants to enforce Azure AD Conditional Access and MFA for App1, Azure AD Application Proxy is the correct implementation.

The other options are not suitable:

A. Policy set in Microsoft Endpoint Manager: Used for device compliance and app management, not for publishing on-premises apps.

B. App configuration policy in Endpoint Manager: Used for mobile app configuration (e.g., MAM policies), not for access publishing.

C. App registration in Azure AD: Used for modern cloud or SaaS apps integration, but App1 is on-premises and needs proxy access.

Correct Answer: D. Azure AD Application Proxy

? The users must first: Register for multi-factor authentication (MFA)

? You must configure: A user risk policy

According to Microsoft SC-300 official learning materials and Exam Ref SC-300: Microsoft Identity and Access Administrator, when the requirement is to address the probability that user identities were compromised, the appropriate feature is Azure AD Identity Protection. Identity Protection detects risky sign-ins and risky users through continuous analysis of login behavior, location, device, and credential exposure signals.

Two types of policies can be created:

Sign-in risk policy – Triggers actions based on suspicious sign-in behavior (for example, unfamiliar location).

User risk policy – Triggers actions when the user’s overall identity is deemed at risk (for example, compromised credentials).

The documentation specifies:

“When user risk is detected, the policy can require the user to change their password to remediate the risk. Users must first be registered for MFA to perform secure password change operations.”

Therefore, before the user risk policy can be enforced, users must be enrolled in multi-factor authentication (MFA). MFA is used during the remediation step (password change) to verify the user’s identity securely.

Thus, to meet the requirement for “the probability that user identities were compromised,” you configure a user risk policy in Azure AD Identity Protection, and ensure that users first register for MFA so that they can complete password change or verification flows when risks are detected.

The SC-300 coverage of Azure AD Connect explains that when you need to bring in a new set of on-premises users or change what is synchronized (for example, adding an additional domain/OU such as ADatum or adjusting filtering), you reopen the Azure AD Connect wizard and choose “Customize synchronization options.” The guide notes that this path lets you “modify directory/OU filtering, add or remove forests, and enable optional sync features” so that only the intended users are synchronized. It contrasts with operational commands: Start-ADSyncSyncCycle merely triggers an immediate delta/full sync of the current configuration; Set-ADSyncScheduler changes the sync cadence or pause/resume behavior; and “Change user sign-in” alters the authentication method (e.g., PHS vs. PTA) but does not control scoping of which users are synced. To meet a requirement to sync the ADatum users according to technical constraints (such as OU/domain selection or feature toggles), you must first configure the scope by running the wizard and selecting Customize synchronization options, then perform/allow a sync cycle to bring those users into Azure AD as defined.

According to the Microsoft SC-300: Identity and Access Administrator official study guide and Microsoft Learn modules on Azure AD Identity Governance, the correct way to manage user access—especially for scenarios involving both internal and external users—is through Entitlement Management in Azure AD Identity Governance.

Entitlement Management uses access packages to define and automate how users obtain access to resources such as groups, SharePoint sites, and applications. Access packages contain policies that specify who can request access (internal users, external users, or both) and how that access is approved and periodically reviewed. The guide clearly states:

“Access packages provide a structured method to configure and automate access for users, ensuring that access assignments follow the organization’s policy and compliance requirements.”

To enable external collaboration with another organization (such as fabrikam.com), Microsoft documentation emphasizes that you must create a connected organization. A connected organization represents an external directory or domain whose users can be invited to request access packages or participate in identity governance workflows. The connected organization defines trust boundaries for cross-tenant collaboration, without requiring domain federation or acceptance.

In summary:

Access packages configure and automate user access.