CSP-Assessor Practice Exam Questions with Answers Customer Security Programme Assessor Certification(CSPAC) Certification

This question addresses the types of Hardware Security Module (HSM) devices offered by SWIFT:

Step 1: SWIFT HSM Overview

SWIFT provides HSMs to secure Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) certificates and cryptographic operations for its users. The CSCF and related security documentation specify two primary types:HSM tokens(portable devices) andHSM boxes(rack-mounted hardware).

Application Hardening is a key concept within theSwift Customer Security Controls Framework (CSCF), specifically addressed under security controls related to protecting systems and reducing vulnerabilities. The CSCF outlines principles to secure applications by minimizing risks, particularly in the context of Swift-related systems. Let’s break down the options and verify them against Swift CSP guidelines.

Step 1: Understand Application Hardening in the Context of Swift CSP

Application Hardening refers to the process of securing an application by reducing its attack surface, limiting access, and mitigating potential vulnerabilities. This aligns with Swift CSP’s overarching goal of enhancing the security of the Swift user community, as outlined in theCSCF v2024(and prior versions like CSCF v2023). Relevant controls fall under domains likeControl Objective 2: Protect Critical SystemsandControl Objective 6: Detect Anomalous Activity.

Step 2: Evaluate Each Option Against Swift CSP Principles

A. Least PrivilegesThe principle of least privilege is a core tenet of application hardening. It ensures that applications (and users) only have the minimum permissions necessary to perform their functions, reducing the risk of misuse or exploitation. This is explicitly referenced in theCSCF v2024, underControl 2.1: Operating System Privileged Account Control, which emphasizes restricting privileges to the minimum required. Application Hardening extends this to software processes, ensuring they run with minimal rights.Conclusion: This applies.

B. Access on a need to haveThis principle, often phrased as “need-to-know” or “need-to-have” in security contexts, ensures that access to applications or their components is granted only to entities that require it for their role. In the Swift CSP, this aligns withControl 2.3: System Access Control, which mandates that access to Swift-related systems (including applications) is restricted to authorized users or processes. Application Hardening incorporates this by ensuring that applications only expose interfaces or resources to authorized entities.Conclusion: This applies.

C. Reduced footprint for less potential vulnerabilitiesReducing the attack surface (or “footprint”) of an application is a fundamental hardening technique. This involves disabling unnecessary features, services, or modules that could be exploited. TheCSCF v2024addresses this underControl 2.5A: Application Hardening, which explicitly requires users to minimize the attack surface of Swift-related applications by removing unused components and limiting exposed services. This directly correlates with reducing potential vulnerabilities.Conclusion: This applies.

D. Enhanced Straight Through Processing (STP)Straight Through Processing refers to the automated, end-to-end processing of transactions without manual intervention, a concept often associated with operational efficiency in financial systems. While STP is relevant to Swift’s messaging and transaction workflows, it is not a principle of Application Hardening. The CSCF does not link STP to security hardening practices, which focus on reducing vulnerabilities rather than optimizing transaction flows.Conclusion: This does not apply.

Step 3: Conclusion and Verification

Application Hardening, as per theSwift Customer Security Controls Framework (CSCF), focuses on security principles that minimize risks to applications. The verified principles areLeast Privileges (A),Access on a need to have (B), andReduced footprint for less potential vulnerabilities (C). These align with Swift CSP’s emphasis on securing critical systems and reducing attack surfaces.

References

Swift Customer Security Controls Framework (CSCF) v2024, Control 2.5A: Application Hardening.

Swift Customer Security Programme – Security Best Practices, Section: Application Security.

CSCF v2024, Control 2.1: Operating System Privileged Account Control, and Control 2.3: System Access Control.

This question identifies the components with which the SwiftNet Link (SNL) communicates, based on its role in the Swift ecosystem under theSwift Customer Security Controls Framework (CSCF) v2024.

Step 1: Understand the Role of SwiftNet Link (SNL)

The SNL is a communication layer that facilitates secure connectivity between a Swift user’s environment and the Swift network. It handles encrypted data transmission and interacts with specific infrastructure components, as detailed in theSwift Alliance Gateway Technical DocumentationandControl 1.1: Swift Environment Protectionof theCSCF v2024.

Step 2: Evaluate Each Option

A. The Graphical User InterfaceThe GUI (e.g., operator interface) is used by personnel to interact with Swift applications (e.g., Alliance Access), but it does not directly communicate with the SNL. The SNL operates at the network and security layer, not the user interface layer, per theSwift User Handbook.Conclusion: Incorrect.

B. The VPN boxesThe SNL communicates with VPN boxes to establish secure tunnels (e.g., using NTLS) for data transmission to the Swift network, as specified in theSwift Security Best PracticesandControl 2.6: Internet Accessibility Restriction.Conclusion: Correct.

C. The HSM deviceThe SNL interacts with the Hardware Security Module (HSM) to manage cryptographic keys and secure communications, as outlined inControl 2.5B: Cryptographic Key Managementand theSwift Alliance Gateway Technical Documentation.Conclusion: Correct.

D. The messaging interface (such as Alliance Access)The SNL connects to the messaging interface (e.g., Alliance Access or Entry) to transmit and receive Swift messages, a core function described in theCSCF v2024underControl 1.1.Conclusion: Correct.

Step 3: Conclusion and Verification

The correct answers areB, C, and D, as the SNL communicates with VPN boxes, HSM devices, and messaging interfaces to ensure secure and functional connectivity to the Swift network, consistent withCSCF v2024and related documentation.

References

Swift Customer Security Controls Framework (CSCF) v2024, Control 1.1: Swift Environment Protection, Control 2.5B: Cryptographic Key Management, Control 2.6: Internet Accessibility Restriction.

Swift Alliance Gateway Technical Documentation, Section: SNL Communication.

Swift Security Best Practices, Section: Network Infrastructure.

The "Independent Assessment Process for Assessors Guidelines" and "Independent Assessment Framework" outline conditions for relying on previous assessments. Let’s evaluate each option:

•Option A: The control compliance conclusion must have already been relied on the past two years

This does not apply. There is no requirement that reliance has been used for two prior years; reliance is assessed annually based on current conditions, per the "Independent Assessment Framework."

•Option B: The previous assessment was performed on the CSCF version of the previous year (at least)

This does not apply. The CSCF version must match the current assessment year (e.g., v2025 for a 2025 assessment), not the previous year, to ensure alignment with updated controls, as per the "Swift Customer Security Controls Framework v2025."

•Option C: The control definition has not changed

This applies. Reliance is permitted only if the control’s definition remains unchanged from the previous assessment, ensuring the prior conclusion remains relevant, as noted in the "CSP_controls_matrix_and_high_test_plan_2025."

•Option D: The control design and implementation are the same

This applies. The assessor must confirm that the control’s design and implementation have not changed since the last assessment, as required by the "Independent Assessment Process for Assessors Guidelines" to validate ongoing compliance.

Summary of Correct Answers:

Reliance is allowed if the control definition has not changed (C) and the control design and implementation are the same (D).

References to SWIFT Customer Security Programme Documents:

•Independent Assessment Process for Assessors Guidelines: Lists conditions for reliance.

•Independent Assessment Framework: Requires unchanged definitions and designs.

•CSP_controls_matrix_and_high_test_plan_2025: Supports reliance criteria.

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This question identifies the supporting documents for a CSP assessment under theSwift Customer Security Programme (CSP).

Step 1: Understand Assessment Documentation

TheIndependent Assessment FrameworkandCSCF v2024specify the documents assessors must use to evaluate compliance with CSCF controls.

Step 2: Evaluate Each Option

A. The CSP User HandbookTheSwift CSP User Handbookprovides guidance on CSP requirements, processes, and best practices, making it a key supporting document for assessors.Conclusion: Correct.

B. The mapping to industry standards articleWhile useful for context, this article is not a primary document for conducting assessments. TheCSCF v2024focuses on its own controls, not industry mappings, which are advisory.Conclusion: Incorrect.

C. The Controls Matrix and High Level Test PlanTheControls Matrix(part of the CSCF) maps controls to components, and theHigh Level Test Planoutlines assessment procedures. Both are essential for structuring and executing the assessment, per theIndependent Assessment Framework.Conclusion: Correct.

D. The Customer Security Controls FrameworkTheCSCF v2024is the foundational document defining controls and requirements, mandatory for all assessments.Conclusion: Correct.

Step 3: Conclusion and Verification

The correct answers areA, C, and D, as these documents are explicitly referenced in theCSCF v2024andIndependent Assessment Frameworkfor conducting CSP assessments.

References

Swift Customer Security Controls Framework (CSCF) v2024, Section: Assessment Guidance.

Swift Independent Assessment Framework, Section: Supporting Documents.

Swift CSP User Handbook, Section: Assessment Process.

The Customer Security Controls Framework (CSCF), part of the SWIFT Customer Security Programme, aims to enhance the security of the SWIFT ecosystem by defining mandatory and advisory security controls for users. The three main objectives are explicitly outlined in the CSCF documentation and reflect a holistic approach to security. Let’s evaluate each option:

•Option A: 1. Secure your environment, 2. Know and Limit Access, 3. Detect and Respond

This is correct. These three objectives align directly with the core principles of the CSCF:

oSecure your environment: This involves implementing controls to protect the SWIFT-related infrastructure (e.g., CSCF Control 1.1 SWIFT Environment Protection, 1.2 Physical Security) against unauthorized access and threats.

oKnow and Limit Access: This focuses on managing access controls and authentication (e.g., CSCF Control 2.2 External Transmission Security, 6.1 Security Awareness) to ensure only authorized personnel can interact with the SWIFT environment.

oDetect and Respond: This emphasizes monitoring and incident response (e.g., CSCF Control 4.1 Logging and 5.1 Operational Incident Response) to identify and mitigate security incidents. These objectives are explicitly stated in the "Swift Customer Security Controls Framework v2025" and reinforced across related documents like the "CSP_controls_matrix_and_high_test_plan_2025."

•Option B: 1. Restrict Internet Access and Protect Critical Systems from General IT Environment, 2. Reduce Attack Surface and Vulnerabilities, 3. Physically Secure the Environment

This is incorrect. While these are specific controls within the CSCF (e.g., Control 1.1, 2.3 System Hardening, 1.2), they are not the overarching objectives. They are implementation details rather than the high-level goals of the framework.

•Option C: 1. Secure and Protect, 2. Prevent and Detect, 3. Share and Prepare

This is incorrect. These terms are vague and do not match the official CSCF objectives. "Share and Prepare" is not a recognized objective, and the phrasing does not align with SWIFT documentation.

•Option D: 1. Raise pragmatically the security bar, 2. Maintain appropriate cyber-security hygiene, 3. React promptly

This is incorrect. While these concepts are related to security improvement, they are not the specific objectives outlined in the CSCF. The language is more general and lacks the structured focus of the official objectives.

Summary of Correct Answer:

The three main objectives of the CSCF are to Secure your environment, Know and Limit Access, and Detect and Respond (A), as defined in the framework’s core principles.

References to SWIFT Customer Security Programme Documents:

•Swift Customer Security Controls Framework v2025: Outlines the three main objectives (Secure, Know and Limit, Detect and Respond).

•CSP_controls_matrix_and_high_test_plan_2025: Aligns controls with these objectives.

•Independent Assessment Framework: Supports the assessment of these objectives.

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CSCF Control "1.2 Physical Security" requires SWIFT users to protect the physical locations of SWIFT-related servers and infrastructure from unauthorized access. Let’s evaluate:

•The control mandates measures such as restricting physical access, using surveillance, and maintaining an access control list for individuals entering server locations.

•Regular review of physical access lists is explicitly included to ensure that only authorized personnel have access and to identify any anomalies or outdated permissions. This is part of the ongoing monitoring requirement under CSCF Control "1.2" and is detailed in the "Assessment template for Mandatory controls."

•The "Independent Assessment Framework" and "CSP_controls_matrix_and_high_test_plan_2025" emphasize this as a mandatory practice to maintain physical security integrity.

Summary of Correct Answer:

The Physical Security control includes a regular review of physical access lists (TRUE).

References to SWIFT Customer Security Programme Documents:

•Swift Customer Security Controls Framework v2025: Control 1.2 requires access list reviews.

•Assessment template for Mandatory controls: Includes this as a compliance criterion.

•CSP_controls_matrix_and_high_test_plan_2025: Tests for regular access list reviews.

A Hardware Security Module (HSM) box in the SWIFT context is a secure device used to manage cryptographic keys and perform security operations, such as signing and encryption for SWIFT transactions. Let’s evaluate each option:

•Option A: Private keys

This is correct. The primary function of an HSM box in the SWIFT environment is to securely store and manage private keys, which are part of the Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) used for asymmetric cryptography. Private keys are used for signing messages to ensure authenticity and integrity, and for decryption to maintain confidentiality. The HSM protects these private keys from unauthorized access, aligning with CSCF Control "1.3 Cryptographic Failover," which mandates the use of HSMs to safeguard cryptographic materials. SWIFT documentation specifies that private keys are stored within the HSM, while public keys are distributed separately (e.g., via certificates).

•Option B: Public keys

This is incorrect. Public keys are not stored in the HSM box. Instead, they are embedded in PKI certificates and distributed to other parties (e.g., SWIFT or counterparties) for verification and encryption purposes. The HSM’s role is to protect the sensitive private keys, not to store public keys, which are openly shared as part of the PKI ecosystem.

•Option C: Both private and public keys

This is incorrect. While the HSM may temporarily handle public keys during cryptographic operations (e.g., for certificate validation), its primary and secure storage function is limited to private keys. Storing both types of keys is not a standard practice in SWIFT’s HSM usage, as public keys are managed outside the HSM in certificate repositories or directories.

Summary of Correct Answer:

The HSM box stores private keys (A), ensuring the security of cryptographic operations in the SWIFT environment.

References to SWIFT Customer Security Programme Documents:

•SWIFT Customer Security Controls Framework (CSCF) v2024: Control 1.3 mandates HSMs for storing private keys securely.

•SWIFT Security Guidelines: Details the HSM’s role in managing private keys for PKI operations.

•SWIFT HSM Documentation: Confirms that private keys are stored in the HSM, with public keys managed externally.

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The Swift Customer Security Programme (CSP) defines specific architecture types in itsCustomer Security Controls Framework (CSCF)documentation to classify how Swift users connect to the Swift network. These architecture types help determine the applicable security controls based on the user’s connectivity and infrastructure setup. The architecture types relevant to this question—A1, A2, A3, and A4—are outlined in theCSCF v2024(and prior versions like CSCF v2023), which is the latest framework as of March 06, 2025, unless superseded by a newer release.

Step 1: Understand the Scenario

The question specifies that the Swift user relies on ansFTP server(Secure File Transfer Protocol) to connect through anexternally exposed connectionwith aservice provider or a group hub. This implies that the user’s Swift environment involves external connectivity, potentially managed by a third party (service provider) or a centralized entity (group hub), rather than a fully self-managed, local setup.

Step 2: Define Swift Architecture Types

According to theSwift Customer Security Controls Framework (CSCF)and supporting documentation (e.g.,Swift Customer Security Programme – Architecture Types Explained), the architecture types are categorized as follows:

A1: Messaging Interface Only (Local Deployment)

The user operates a local Swift messaging interface (e.g., Alliance Access/Entry) with no external connectivity to a service provider or hub.

Connectivity to Swift is direct and locally managed.

A2: Messaging Interface with Connectivity Service (External Connectivity)

The user operates a local Swift messaging interface but connects to Swift via anexternally provided connectivity service(e.g., through a service provider or third-party connection).

The connection point is exposed externally to the service provider.

A3: Hosted Messaging Interface

The Swift messaging interface itself is hosted externally by a service provider, and the user accesses it remotely (e.g., via a browser or client application).

No local messaging interface exists at the user’s site.

A4: Group Hub or Shared Connectivity

The user connects to Swift via agroup hubor shared infrastructure operated by a parent entity, affiliate, or third-party provider.

This may involve centralized messaging and connectivity services shared across multiple entities.

Step 3: Analyze the Scenario Against Architecture Types

sFTP Server Usage: The use of an sFTP server suggests a file transfer mechanism, commonly employed in Swift environments to exchange payment messages or files with external parties (e.g., service providers or hubs). This aligns with scenarios where connectivity extends beyond the user’s local environment.

Externally Exposed Connection: The phrase “externally exposed connection” indicates that the Swift user’s infrastructure interfaces with an external entity (service provider or group hub), ruling out a fully self-contained setup.

Service Provider or Group Hub:

Aservice providertypically implies a third-party entity managing connectivity or hosting services, which could align withA2(external connectivity) orA3(hosted interface).

Agroup hubsuggests a shared infrastructure within a corporate group or consortium, pointing towardA4.

Step 4: Match to Architecture Types

A1: Does not apply. A1 requires a fully local deployment with no external connectivity reliance. The externally exposed sFTP connection contradicts this.

A2: Applies. If the Swift user maintains a local messaging interface (e.g., Alliance Access) and uses the sFTP server to connect to a service provider’s external infrastructure, this fits A2. The “externally exposed connection” aligns with A2’s requirement of relying on an external connectivity service.

A3: Unlikely, but possible with clarification. A3 involves a fully hosted messaging interface (e.g., no local Alliance software). The question does not explicitly state that the messaging interface is hosted externally, only that an sFTP server is used for connectivity. Without evidence of a hosted interface, A3 is not a strong fit.

A4: Applies if a group hub is involved. If the sFTP server connects to a centralized group hub (e.g., a shared Swift infrastructure within a corporate group), this matches A4. The “group hub” reference in the question supports this possibility.

Step 5: Conclusion and Verification

Based on theCSCF v2024architecture definitions and theSwift CSP Architecture Types Explainedguidance:

A2is confirmed because the sFTP server and externally exposed connection suggest reliance on a service provider for connectivity, with a local messaging interface assumed unless otherwise specified.

A4is also applicable if the “group hub” scenario is active, indicating shared connectivity infrastructure.

The question asks to “choose all that apply,” and since it specifies “service providerorgroup hub,” both A2 and A4 are valid depending on the context. However, A2 is the most universally applicable based on the sFTP and external connection details, with A4 as an additional fit for group hub cases.

References

Swift Customer Security Controls Framework (CSCF) v2024, Section: Architecture Types.

Swift Customer Security Programme – Architecture Types Explained, available via Swift’s official documentation portal (swift.com).

Swift CSP FAQ, clarifying connectivity and hosting scenarios.

This question addresses the process for resolving uncertainty about the applicability of a CSCF control to a specific component.

Step 1: Understand the CSCF Documentation Structure

TheSwift Customer Security Controls Framework (CSCF) v2024provides detailed guidance on control applicability, including sections like the Introduction and appendices, as well as support mechanisms for users.

Step 2: Evaluate Each Option

A. Call your Swift contactWhile contacting a Swift representative might be helpful, it is not the first recommended step inthe CSCF documentation. The framework prioritizes self-service through documentation and support channels like swift.com before direct contact.Conclusion: This is not a primary step.

B. Check appendix F of the CSCFAppendix F of theCSCF v2024provides detailed guidance on control applicability, including scenarios, architecture types, and component mappings. It is a key resource for clarifying whether a control applies to a specific component.Conclusion: This is correct.

C. Check carefully the Introduction section of the CSCFThe Introduction section of theCSCF v2024outlines the scope, objectives, and applicability of controls, including definitions of in-scope components and architecture types. It’s a critical starting point for understanding control applicability.Conclusion: This is correct.

D. Open a case with Swift support via the case manager on swift.com if further information or solution cannot be found in the documentationIf the CSCF documentation (e.g., Introduction, Appendix F) does not resolve the uncertainty, theSwift CSP FAQandSwift Support Guidelinesrecommend opening a case via the swift.com case manager. This ensures users can get official clarification from Swift support.Conclusion: This is correct.

Step 3: Conclusion and Verification

The verified steps areB, C, and D, as they align with the recommended process in theCSCF v2024for resolving uncertainty about control applicability: first consult the documentation (Introduction and Appendix F), then escalate to Swift support if needed.

References

Swift Customer Security Controls Framework (CSCF) v2024, Introduction Section and Appendix F.

Swift CSP FAQ, Section: Resolving Control Applicability.

Swift Support Guidelines, Section: Case Manager Usage.

This question examines whether an internal audit department can submit and approve a Swift user’s attestation on the KYC-SA Swift portal.

Step 1: Understand Attestation Process

TheIndependent Assessment FrameworkandCSCF v2024require attestations to be submitted by an independent party or authorized user representative, not the internal audit department, to ensure objectivity.

Step 2: Evaluate Each Option

A. Yes, providing this is agreed by the head of IT operations and the CISOInternal audit cannot submit or approve attestations, regardless of internal agreements, per theIndependent Assessment Framework.Conclusion: Incorrect.

B. No, this is never an optionTheCSCF v2024andSwift CSP Compliance Guidelinesprohibit internal audit from submitting or approving attestations, as they lack independence from the audited entity.Conclusion: Correct.

C. Yes, an internal auditor can submit the attestation for approval provided they have the appropriate credentials for swift.com. The CISO remains in charge of the approval of the attestationIncorrect. Internal auditors cannot submit or approve, even with credentials, due to independence requirements.Conclusion: Incorrect.

D. Yes, with approval from the Chief auditorIncorrect. Chief auditor approval does not override the independence requirement.Conclusion: Incorrect.

Step 3: Conclusion and Verification

The correct answer isB, as theCSCF v2024andIndependent Assessment Frameworkprohibit internal audit from submitting or approving attestations.

References

Swift Customer Security Controls Framework (CSCF) v2024, Section: Independent Assessment.

Swift Independent Assessment Framework, Section: Attestation Submission.

Swift CSP Compliance Guidelines, Section: Independence Requirements.

SWIFT, which stands for Society for Worldwide Interbank Financial Telecommunication, is a global member-owned cooperative that provides a network for financial institutions to securely exchange information, primarily for financial transactions. Let’s break down the options and evaluate them against SWIFT’s official services as outlined in the SWIFT Customer Security Programme (CSP) and related documentation.

Option A: A platform for messagingThis is correct. SWIFT’s core function is to provide a secure, standardized messaging platform for financial institutions to exchange information. SWIFT operates a messaging network that enables banks, financial institutions, and other entities to send and receive standardized financial messages (such as payment instructions, securities transactions, and trade messages). This is facilitated through services like SWIFTNet, which is the messaging infrastructure that ensures secure and reliable communication. The SWIFT Customer Security Controls Framework (CSCF) emphasizes the security of this messaging platform, with controls designed to protect the integrity, confidentiality, and availability of the messaging environment. For example, the CSCF includes controls like "1.1 SWIFT Environment Protection," which ensures the messaging platform is isolated and secure.

Option B: Standards for communicatingThis is also correct. SWIFT is well-known for developing and maintaining global standards for financial messaging, most notably the SWIFT message types (MT) and the newer ISO 20022 standard, which is increasingly being adopted for cross-border payments and reporting. These standards define the format and structure of messages, ensuring consistency and interoperability across the global financial community. For instance, a payment instruction sent via SWIFT follows a standardized format (e.g., MT103 for a customer payment), which ensures that the sending and receiving institutions can process it efficiently. The SWIFT CSP documentation, including the CSCF, indirectly references these standards by focusing on the secure transmission of standardized messages, as seen in controls like "2.1 Internal Data Transmission Security," which ensures data integrity during communication.

Option C: Hosting for financial institutionsThis is incorrect. SWIFT does not provide hosting services for financial institutions. SWIFT’s role is focused on messaging and standards, not on hosting infrastructure like data centers or cloud services for financial institutions. While SWIFT does offer some cloud-based connectivity options (e.g., Alliance Cloud for smaller institutions to connect to the SWIFT network), this is not the same as providing hosting services for the institutions’ broader IT operations. Hosting infrastructure is typically managed by the institutions themselves or third-party providers, and the CSCF emphasizes that institutions are responsible for securing their own environments (e.g., Control "6.1 Security Awareness" highlights the need for institutions to manage their own security).

Option D: A high-level programming languageThis is incorrect. SWIFT does not provide a programming language. SWIFT’s focus is on messaging protocols and standards, not on developing or providing programming languages.Financial institutions may use various programming languages (like Java, Python, or C++) to integrate with SWIFT’s messaging system via APIs or interfaces like SWIFT Alliance Access, but SWIFT itself does not develop or distribute programming languages. The CSCF does not reference programming languages as a SWIFT offering; instead, it focuses on secure integration with SWIFT services, such as Control "2.3 System Hardening," which ensures that systems interacting with SWIFT are secure.

Summary of Correct Answers:SWIFT provides a platform for messaging (Option A) through its SWIFTNet network and standards for communicating (Option B) via its message formats like MT and ISO 20022. The other options—hosting services and a high-level programming language—are not part of SWIFT’s offerings.

References to SWIFT Customer Security Programme Documents:

SWIFT Customer Security Controls Framework (CSCF) v2024: The CSCF outlines the security controls that protect the SWIFT messaging environment, emphasizing SWIFT’s role in secure messaging (e.g., Control 1.1, 2.1).

SWIFT User Handbook: Details SWIFT’s messaging services and standards, including SWIFTNet and message types like MT and ISO 20022.

SWIFT CSP Implementation Guide: Highlights that institutions are responsible for their own infrastructure, ruling out hosting as a SWIFT service.

This question addresses the terminology related to VPN boxes in the Swift environment and their association with managed-customer premises equipment (M-CPE). Let’s verify this based on Swift CSP documentation.

Step 1: Understand VPN Boxes and M-CPE in Swift Context

In the Swift ecosystem, VPN boxes are typically part of the connectivity infrastructure used to establish secure tunnels (e.g., Network Transport Layer Security - NTLS) for communication with the Swift network. The term "managed-customer premises equipment (M-CPE)" generally refers to hardware or devices managed by a service provider or third party on the customer’s premises, often in telecommunications or IT contexts. TheSwift Customer Security Controls Framework (CSCF) v2024and related technical documentation provide insights into Swift’s infrastructure terminology.

Step 2: Analyze the Statement

The statement claims that the "cluster of VPN boxes is also called managed-customer premises equipment (M-CPE)." We need to determine if this is an official or recognized designation within the Swift CSP.

Step 3: Evaluate Against Swift CSP Guidelines

TheSwift Alliance Gateway Technical DocumentationandSwift Security Best Practicesdescribe VPN boxes (or similar connectivity devices) as part of the SwiftNet Link (SNL) infrastructure, often deployed at the user’s premises to secure communications. These devices are typically managed by the Swift user or a designated service provider, depending on the architecture (e.g., A2 or A4).

The term "M-CPE" is not specifically defined or used in Swift CSP documentation (e.g.,CSCF v2024,Swift User Handbook, orSwift Network Security Guidelines). Instead, Swift refers to such equipment as part of the "customer premises equipment (CPE)" when managed by the user, or as "managed services" when outsourced to a provider. However, "M-CPE" as a specific term for a cluster of VPN boxes is not corroborated.

In some IT contexts outside Swift, M-CPE might imply managed equipment, but Swift’s documentation does not adopt this terminology for VPN clusters, which are considered part of the broader connectivity infrastructure.

Step 4: Conclusion and Verification

The statement isFALSEbecause theCSCF v2024and related Swift documentation do not use "managed-customer premises equipment (M-CPE)" as a term for a cluster of VPN boxes. The correct terminology aligns with "customer premises equipment" or "managed connectivity devices," depending on the setup, but not specifically M-CPE.

References

Swift Customer Security Controls Framework (CSCF) v2024, Control 1.1: Swift Environment Protection.

Swift Alliance Gateway Technical Documentation, Section: Connectivity Infrastructure.

Swift Security Best Practices, Section: Network Security Devices.

The diagram provided represents a Swift user environment with an outsourcing agent, showing various components involved in the Swift workflow. The Swift Customer Security Programme (CSP) mandates specific security controls to protect critical components, particularly those handling Swift-related data or connectivity. Let’s analyze the diagram and determine which components must be placed in asecure zoneas per theCSCF v2024.

Step 1: Understand the Secure Zone Requirement

Asecure zonein the Swift CSP context refers to a segregated, protected environment where critical Swift-related components are isolated from general-purpose systems to minimize risks. This is outlined inControl 1.1: Swift Environment Protectionof theCSCF v2024, which mandates that Swift infrastructure (e.g., messaging interfaces, connectors, and related systems) must be logically and physically separated from non-Swift systems. The secure zone ensures that only authorized systems and users can interact with Swift components.

Step 2: Analyze the Diagram and Identify Components

The diagram includes the following components:

A. Middleware server (customer connector): Labeled as Component A, this server facilitates connectivity between the Swift user’s systems and the outsourcing agent’s infrastructure.

B. General-purpose PC Operator GUI: This is a general-purpose system used by an operator to interact with the Swift environment.

C. Swift-related OAA (Operational Application Architecture): Labeled as Component C, this represents the Swift messaging interface (e.g., Alliance Access/Entry) managed by the outsourcing agent.

D. Customer connector: This component, within the outsourcing agent’s environment, interfaces directly with the Swift connector or interface.

E. Dedicated PC Admin users: This represents administrative systems used to manage the Swift environment.Additionally, there’s aConnector or Interface(SB, L2BA, or Enabler) connecting to the Swift network.

Step 3: Determine Which Components Belong in a Secure Zone

A. Middleware server (customer connector):This component facilitates connectivity between the Swift user and the outsourcing agent’s Swift-related systems. According toControl 1.1: Swift Environment Protection, any system that directly interacts with the Swift messaging infrastructure (e.g., as a connector) must reside in a secure zone to prevent unauthorized access or tampering. Since this middleware server is part of the Swift data flow, it must be in a secure zone.Conclusion: Component A must be in a secure zone.

B. General-purpose PC Operator GUI:This is a general-purpose system used by operators, not a core Swift component. TheCSCF v2024underControl 1.2: Logical Access Controlrecommends that operator systems (e.g., GUIclients) should not reside in the same secure zone as critical Swift infrastructure to avoid introducing vulnerabilities from general-purpose systems. These systems typically connect to the secure zone via controlled interfaces (e.g., VPN or jump servers) but are not part of it.Conclusion: Component B does not need to be in a secure zone.

C. Swift-related OAA:This represents the Swift messaging interface (e.g., Alliance Access/Entry), which is a core component of the Swift environment.Control 1.1explicitly requires that messaging interfaces be placed in a secure zone to protect them from external threats and ensure segregation from non-Swift systems. Since this component is directly involved in Swift message processing, it must be in a secure zone.Conclusion: Component C must be in a secure zone.

D. Customer connector:This connector interfaces directly with the Swift connector or interface (SB, L2BA, or Enabler) to facilitate communication with the Swift network. As perControl 1.1, any component that directly connects to the Swift network or handles Swift traffic must be in a secure zone to ensure end-to-end security of the communication chain. This applies to the customer connector within the outsourcing agent’s environment.Conclusion: Component D must be in a secure zone.

E. Dedicated PC Admin users:Administrative systems used to manage the Swift environment are typically not placed in the same secure zone as the operational Swift components. According toControl 1.2: Logical Access Control, administrative access should be tightly controlled and segregated, often using jump servers or bastion hosts to access the secure zone. While these systems need secure access, they are not part of the secure zone itself.Conclusion: Component E does not need to be in a secure zone.

Step 4: Conclusion and Verification

Based on theCSCF v2024requirements, the components that must be placed in a secure zone are those directly involved in Swift message processing or connectivity to the Swift network. These are:

A. Middleware server (customer connector)

C. Swift-related OAA

D. Customer connectorComponent B (general-purpose PC) and Component E (admin PC) are not required to be in the secure zone, as they are operator or administrative systems that should be segregated from the Swift operational environment.

References

Swift Customer Security Controls Framework (CSCF) v2024, Control 1.1: Swift Environment Protection.

Swift Customer Security Programme – Security Best Practices, Section: Secure Zone Configuration.

CSCF v2024, Control 1.2: Logical Access Control.

The CSCF requires protection of operator session flows to ensure confidentiality and integrity, particularly for sessions involving SWIFT-related components. This is addressed under Control "2.1 Internal Data Transmission Security" and "2.2 External Transmission Security." Let’s evaluate each option:

•Option A: System administrator sessions towards a host running a SWIFT-related component (on-premises or remote)

This is valid. System administrator sessions to hosts running SWIFT components (e.g., Alliance Gateway on-premises or in the cloud) must be protected using encryption (e.g., TLS) and authentication to prevent unauthorized access or data breaches, aligning with CSCF Control "2.1."

•Option B: All sessions to and from a jump server used to access a component in a secure zone

This is valid. Jump servers (bastion hosts) used to access the secure zone (e.g., for managing Alliance Access) must have all sessions encrypted and integrity-checked, as required by CSCF Control "1.1 SWIFT Environment Protection" and "2.2" to secure access points.

•Option C: All sessions towards a SWIFT-related application run by an Outsourcing Agent, a Service Bureau, or an L2BA Provider

This is valid. Sessions to applications hosted by third parties (e.g., Alliance Lite2 Business Application by an L2BA Provider) must be protected, as per CSCF Control "2.2" and the "Outsourcing Agents - Security Requirements Baseline v2025," which mandates secure transmission regardless of location.

•Option D: All of the other answers are valid

This is correct. Since A, B, and C all describe session flows that require protection under the CSCF, the comprehensive answer is that all listed session types must be secured for confidentiality and integrity.

Summary of Correct Answer:

All operator session flows listed (A, B, and C) are expected to be protected, making D the correct choice.

References to SWIFT Customer Security Programme Documents:

•Swift Customer Security Controls Framework v2025: Controls 2.1 and 2.2 mandate session protection.

•Outsourcing Agents - Security Requirements Baseline v2025: Extends protection to third-party-hosted applications.

•CSP_controls_matrix_and_high_test_plan_2025: Includes all listed session types in security testing.

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This question examines the messaging capabilities of Alliance Lite2 under the Swift Customer Security Programme (CSP).

Step 1: Understand Alliance Lite2

Alliance Lite2 is a lightweight Swift solution designed for smaller financial institutions, providing access to Swift messaging services. Its capabilities are detailed in theSwift Alliance Lite2 User Guideand referenced in theCSCF v2024context.

Step 2: Analyze the Statement

The statement claims that Alliance Lite2 "only supports the sending and receiving of FIN messages." FIN messages are part of the FIN service for payment transactions, but Alliance Lite2’s scope extends beyond this.

Step 3: Evaluate Against Swift Guidelines

TheSwift Alliance Lite2 User Guidespecifies that Alliance Lite2 supports multiple message types, including:

FIN messages(e.g., MT103 for payments).

FileAct(for file transfers).

InterAct(for real-time messaging).

TheCSCF v2024does not restrict Alliance Lite2 to FIN messages; it applies security controls to all supported services. TheSwift CSP FAQconfirms that Alliance Lite2 users must comply with controls for all active services, not just FIN.

Thus, the statement that it "only supports" FIN messages is false, as it also supports FileAct and InterAct.

Step 4: Conclusion and Verification

The answer isB, as Alliance Lite2 supports more than just FIN messages, including FileAct and InterAct, per theSwift Alliance Lite2 User GuideandCSCF v2024.

References

Swift Alliance Lite2 User Guide, Section: Supported Services.

Swift Customer Security Controls Framework (CSCF) v2024, Control 1.1: Swift Environment Protection.

Swift CSP FAQ, Section: Alliance Lite2 Scope.

The CSCF and "Outsourcing Agents - Security Requirements Baseline v2025" define responsibilities for securing virtualization or cloud platforms hosting SWIFT-related components. Let’s evaluate each combination:

•Option A: For on-premises virtualization platform: by the platform provider

This is not correct. An on-premises virtualization platform (e.g., VMware or Hyper-V hosting Alliance Gateway) is managed by the SWIFT user, not the platform provider (e.g., VMware). The "platform provider" supplies the software, but the user is responsible for securing the on-premises environment, including hardening, patching, and compliance with CSCF Control "2.3 System Hardening."

•Option B: For virtualization platform deployed at a third party on which user’s SWIFT-related components are virtually hosted: by the third party

This is correct. If the virtualization platform is hosted by a third party (e.g., a service provider hosting SWIFT components), the third party is responsible for securing the platform, as per the "Outsourcing Agents - Security Requirements Baseline v2025" and CSCF Control "1.1."

•Option C: For on-premises container platform: by the SWIFT user

This is correct. An on-premises container platform (e.g., Docker or Kubernetes hosting SWIFT applications) is the user’s responsibility to secure, aligning with CSCF Control "1.1" and the user’s ownership of on-premises infrastructure.

•Option D: For Cloud Provider: the cloud provider

This is correct. In a cloud model (e.g., IaaS like Alliance Cloud on AWS), the cloud provider (e.g., AWS) is responsible for securing the underlying platform, as outlined in the "Outsourcing Agents - Security Requirements Baseline v2025."

Summary of Correct Answer:

The combination that is not correct is A, as the SWIFT user, not the platform provider, is responsible for securing an on-premises virtualization platform.

References to SWIFT Customer Security Programme Documents:

•Swift Customer Security Controls Framework v2025: Control 1.1 defines responsibilities for on-premises platforms.

•Outsourcing Agents - Security Requirements Baseline v2025: Specifies third-party and cloud provider responsibilities.

•Independent Assessment Framework: Confirms user responsibility for on-premises setups.

This question determines the minimum number of Swift Security Officers (SOs) required by an organization under theSwift Customer Security Programme (CSP).

Step 1: Understand Security Officer Requirements

TheSwift Customer Security Controls Framework (CSCF) v2024, underControl 2.3: System Access Control, and theSwift User Handbookoutline the roles and minimum requirements for Security Officers, who manage security settings and keys.

Step 2: Analyze the Requirement

TheSwift User HandbookandSwift Security Best Practicesspecify that at least two Security Officers are required to ensure segregation of duties and continuity (e.g., in case one is unavailable).

This minimum is enforced to prevent single points of failure and align withControl 2.3, which mandates multi-factor authentication and role separation for privileged access.

Step 3: Evaluate Each Option

A. 1: Insufficient, as a single SO risks unavailability or lack of segregation, perSwift Security Best Practices.Conclusion: Incorrect.

B. 2: Meets the minimum requirement for redundancy and segregation, as stated in theSwift User Handbook.Conclusion: Correct.

C. 3: Exceeds the minimum but is not required unless the organization’s risk assessment demands it, per theCSCF v2024.Conclusion: Incorrect (not minimum).

D. 4: Also exceeds the minimum, not mandated as a baseline.Conclusion: Incorrect (not minimum).

Step 4: Conclusion and Verification

The correct answer isB, as theCSCF v2024andSwift User Handbookmandate a minimum of two Swift Security Officers.

References

Swift Customer Security Controls Framework (CSCF) v2024, Control 2.3: System Access Control.

Swift User Handbook, Section: Security Officer Roles.

Swift Security Best Practices, Section: Segregation of Duties.

This question revisits the role of the Swift Alliance Gateway (SAG), similar to Question 6, but with different statements.

Step 1: Recap the Role of Alliance Gateway

The Swift Alliance Gateway (SAG) is a connectivity and security layer that facilitates interaction with the Swift network, as detailed in theSwift Alliance Gateway User Guideand referenced inControl 1.1: Swift Environment Protectionof theCSCF v2024.

Step 2: Evaluate Each Option

A. It is used to exchange messages over the Swift networkThe SAG acts as a gateway to concentrate and securely route SwiftNet traffic, enabling the exchange of messages over the Swift network. It handles connectivity, security (e.g., PKI), and message routing, as confirmed in theSwift Alliance Gateway Technical Documentation. This aligns with its role in the Swift ecosystem.Conclusion: This is correct.

B. It is used to create messages to send over the Swift networkAs noted in Question 6, the SAG does not create messages. Message creation is handled by applications like Alliance Access or Entry. The SAG’s role is to route and secure messages, not generate them, per theSwift Alliance Gateway User Guide.Conclusion: This is incorrect.

Step 3: Conclusion and Verification

The correct statement isA, as the Alliance Gateway’s primary function is to facilitate the secure exchange of messages over the Swift network, consistent with Swift CSP documentation.

References

Swift Alliance Gateway User Guide, Section: Functionality Overview.

Swift Customer Security Controls Framework (CSCF) v2024, Control 1.1: Swift Environment Protection.

Swift Alliance Gateway Technical Documentation, Section: Message Routing.

The "SWIFT footprint" refers to the extent of SWIFT-related infrastructure (hardware, software, and connectivity components) that a user must manage within their environment. A smaller footprint means less local infrastructure to maintain, typically achieved through cloud-based or managed services. Let’s evaluate each option:

•Option A: Full stack of products up to the Messaging Interface

This refers to an on-premises deployment where the user manages a complete set of SWIFT components, including the messaging interface (e.g., Alliance Access), communication interface (e.g., Alliance Gateway), SwiftNet Link (SNL), HSM, and VPN boxes for connectivity to the SWIFT network. This setup requires significant local infrastructure, including servers, security devices, and network components, resulting in a large SWIFT footprint.

•Option B: Alliance Remote Gateway

Alliance Remote Gateway (ARG) is a service where the Alliance Gateway is hosted remotely by SWIFT or a third party, but the user still maintains a messaging interface (e.g., Alliance Access) locally. While this reduces the footprint slightly by outsourcing the communication interface, the user still manages the messaging interface, HSM, and local connectivity components, resulting in a moderate footprint.

•Option C: Lite 2 or Alliance Cloud

This is the correct answer. Alliance Lite2 and Alliance Cloud are cloud-based solutions designed for smaller institutions or those seeking a minimal local footprint. In Alliance Lite2, the user connects to SWIFT via a lightweight client (Alliance Lite2 AutoClient) or a browser-based interface, with most infrastructure (e.g., messaging interface, communication interface, HSM) hosted by SWIFT in the cloud. Alliance Cloud similarly hosts the full SWIFT stack (including Alliance Access and Alliance Gateway) in a SWIFT-managed cloud environment, requiring only minimal local infrastructure (e.g., a secure connection to the cloud). This results in the smallest SWIFT footprint, as the user manages very little on-premises infrastructure. The CSCF still applies, but many controls are managed by SWIFT (e.g., "1.1 SWIFT Environment Protection").

•Option D: A user with a Messaging Interface behind a Service Bureau

A Service Bureau is a third-party provider that hosts SWIFT infrastructure (e.g., Alliance Gateway, SNL) for multiple users, but the user still maintains a local messaging interface (e.g., Alliance Access) to connect to the Service Bureau. This setup reduces the footprint compared to a full on-premises deployment, as the user does not manage the communication interface or network connectivity components. However, the local messaging interface and associated security components (e.g., HSM) still constitute a larger footprint than a fully cloud-based solution like Alliance Lite2 or Alliance Cloud.

Summary of Correct Answer:

Alliance Lite2 or Alliance Cloud (C) has the smallest SWIFT footprint, as most infrastructure is hosted in the cloud by SWIFT, minimizing the user’s local management responsibilities.

References to SWIFT Customer Security Programme Documents:

•SWIFT Customer Security Controls Framework (CSCF) v2024: Control 1.1 applies to cloud deployments like Alliance Cloud, reducing the user’s local footprint.

•SWIFT Alliance Lite2 Documentation: Describes the minimal infrastructure required for Lite2 users.

•SWIFT Alliance Cloud Documentation: Highlights the fully hosted nature of the solution, minimizing the SWIFT footprint.

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Alliance Gateway (SAG) is a SWIFT product that facilitates connectivity between messaging interfaces and the SWIFT network. Let’s evaluate the statement:

•A messaging interface in SWIFT terminology refers to applications like Alliance Access (SAA) or Alliance Entry, which are responsible for creating, validating, and processing SWIFT messages (e.g., FIN MT messages). These interfaces handle the business logic of message flows, interfacing with back-office systems and preparing messages for transmission.

•Alliance Gateway, however, is classified as a communication interface. It acts as a hub to consolidate message flows from multiple messaging interfaces (e.g., Alliance Access) and connects them to the SWIFT network via SwiftNet Link (SNL). SAG does not create or process messages; it manages their transport, ensuring secure transmission over the SWIFT Secure IP Network (SIPN). This distinction is clear in SWIFT documentation, where SAG is described as a connectivity layer, not a messaging interface.

•The CSCF reinforces this separation by applying specific controls to messaging interfaces (e.g., "2.1 Internal Data Transmission Security" for Alliance Access) and communication interfaces (e.g., "1.1 SWIFT Environment Protection" for SAG). Since SAG does not perform the functions of a messaging interface, the statement is false.

Summary of Correct Answer:

Alliance Gateway is a communication interface, not a messaging interface, making the statement false.

References to SWIFT Customer Security Programme Documents:

•SWIFT Customer Security Controls Framework (CSCF) v2024: Differentiates messaging interfaces (Control 2.1) from communication interfaces (Control 1.1).

•SWIFT Alliance Gateway Documentation: Describes SAG as a communication interface for SWIFTNet connectivity.

•SWIFT Architecture Glossary: Clarifies the roles of messaging interfaces (e.g., Alliance Access) versus communication interfaces (e.g., Alliance Gateway).

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This question addresses the type of control effectiveness that must be validated during an independent assessment under the Swift Customer Security Programme (CSP). Let’s analyze this based on theSwift Customer Security Controls Framework (CSCF)and related guidelines.

Step 1: Understand Independent Assessments in Swift CSP

The Swift CSP mandates that users undergo an independent assessment to validate their compliance with the CSCF controls. This requirement is detailed in theCSCF v2024, under theIndependent Assessment Framework. The purpose of the assessment is to ensure that controls are not only designed appropriately but also implemented and operating effectively.

Step 2: Evaluate Each Option

A. Effectiveness is never validated only the control designThis statement is incorrect. TheIndependent Assessment Frameworkexplicitly requiresvalidation of both the design and theoperational effectivenessof controls. Assessing only the design without confirming that the control is working as intended does not meet Swift’s compliance requirements.Conclusion: This is incorrect.

B. An independent assessment is a point in time review with possible reviews of older evidence as appropriateWhile this statement is factually true (an independent assessment is indeed a point-in-time review, as per theCSCF v2024), it does not directly answer the question about what type of control effectiveness needs to be validated. It describes the nature of the assessment, not the focus of validation.Conclusion: This does not address the question directly.

C. Operational effectiveness needs to be validatedTheIndependent Assessment Frameworkspecifies that an independent assessment must validate both the design and the operational effectiveness of CSCF controls. Operational effectiveness ensures that controls are functioning as intended over a period of time, not just designed correctly on paper. This includes testing controls (e.g., logging, access controls) to confirm they are working in practice, as required for attestation.Conclusion: This is correct.

D. None of the aboveSince option C is correct, this option is not applicable.Conclusion: This is incorrect.

Step 3: Conclusion and Verification

The correct answer isC, as theCSCF v2024andIndependent Assessment Frameworkrequire validation of the operational effectiveness of controls during an independent assessment, ensuring that controls are not only designed but also implemented and functioning effectively.

References

Swift Customer Security Controls Framework (CSCF) v2024, Section: Independent Assessment Requirements.

Swift Independent Assessment Framework, Section: Assessment Scope and Objectives.

Swift CSP FAQ, Section: Independent Assessment Guidelines.

The SWIFT CSP defines architecture types (A1 to A4) based on the components a user owns and manages, as outlined in the "CSP Architecture Type - Decision tree" and "Swift Customer Security Controls Framework v2025." These types determine the applicable security controls and assessment requirements. Let’s analyze the scenario:

•A local communication interface refers to a component like Alliance Gateway (SAG), which manages connectivity to the SWIFT network via SwiftNet Link (SNL) and VPN boxes. The user owns this interface locally as their main channel.

•A connector (or customer connector) is a custom application or integration layer that connects to SWIFT services, often used as an alternative or backup channel. In this case, it serves as a contingency backup.

•The architecture types are:

oA1: Full stack (owns messaging interface, communication interface, and network components, e.g., Alliance Access, Alliance Gateway, VPN boxes).

oA2: Owns a customer connector and communication interface, with the messaging interface hosted elsewhere (e.g., by a service bureau or SWIFT).

oA3: Owns only a customer connector, relying on external communication and messaging interfaces.

oA4: Uses a fully hosted solution (e.g., Alliance Cloud or Lite2), owning no local components.

•The scenario indicates the user owns a local communication interface (e.g., SAG) as the primary channel and a connector as a backup. However, there is no mention of owning a messaging interface (e.g., Alliance Access) locally. This suggests the messaging interface is likely hosted externally (e.g., by a service bureau or SWIFT), which aligns with the A2 architecture type. The "CSP Architecture Type - Decision tree" classifies A2 as a user with a communication interface and a customer connector, where the messaging interface is not locally owned. The backup connector does not change the primary architecture type, as it is an additional component within the A2 framework.

•Option A: A1

This is incorrect. A1 requires ownership of a messaging interface (e.g., Alliance Access), which is not mentioned.

•Option B: A2

This is correct. A2 fits the scenario of owning a communication interface and a customer connector, with the messaging interface potentially hosted elsewhere.

•Option C: A3

This is incorrect. A3 involves only a customer connector, not a communication interface.

•Option D: A4

This is incorrect. A4 applies to fully hosted solutions with no local ownership of connectors or interfaces.

Summary of Correct Answer:

The SWIFT user with a local communication interface as the main channel and a connector as a backup is of architecture type A2 (B).

References to SWIFT Customer Security Programme Documents:

•Swift Customer Security Controls Framework v2025: Defines architecture types A1-A4.

•CSP Architecture Type - Decision tree: Classifies A2 for communication interface and customer connector ownership.

•Assessment template for Mandatory controls: Applies to A2 architecture.

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This question addresses the obligations of a Swift CSP Certified Assessor regarding the provision of evidence to Swift for quality assurance purposes.

Step 1: Understand the Role of a Swift CSP Certified Assessor

A Swift CSP Certified Assessor is an independent professional or entity authorized to conduct CSP assessments under theIndependent Assessment Framework. The certification program, managed by Swift, includes specific obligations to ensure the integrity and quality of assessments.

Step 2: Analyze the Request for Evidence

Swift has contacted the assessor to provide evidence from an assessment to support their quality assurance validation process. This request implies a review of the assessor’s work to ensure compliance with CSP standards.

TheSwift CSP Assessor Certification Program Guidelinesstate that certified assessors are obligated to cooperate with Swift’s quality assurance processes. This includes providingevidence (e.g., assessment reports, workpapers) upon request to verify the accuracy and adherence to methodology, as part of Swift’s oversight.

Confidentiality is a concern, but theCSCF v2024andAssessor Certification Programclarify that assessors must share evidence with Swift under a non-disclosure agreement (NDA) or similar confidentiality framework, ensuring data protection while allowing validation.

Step 3: Evaluate Each Option

A. Yes, one of the obligations of the certification programme is that quality assessment can be performed by SwiftTheSwift CSP Assessor Certification Program Guidelinesexplicitly outline that Swift may conduct quality assessments, and assessors must provide evidence to support this process. This is a contractual obligation of certification, aligning with Swift’s responsibility to maintain CSP integrity.Conclusion: This is correct.

B. No, it's confidentialWhile confidentiality is critical (protected underControl 2.3: System Access Controland Swift’s privacy policies), the certification program requires assessors to share evidence with Swift for quality assurance, subject to confidentiality agreements. Refusing to provide evidence would breach the assessor’s obligations.Conclusion: This is incorrect.

Step 4: Conclusion and Verification

The answer isA, as theSwift CSP Assessor Certification Programmandates that certified assessors must support Swift’s quality assurance validation by providing evidence, balancing confidentiality with compliance oversight.

References

Swift Customer Security Controls Framework (CSCF) v2024, Control 2.3: System Access Control.

Swift CSP Assessor Certification Program Guidelines, Section: Obligations and Quality Assurance.

Swift Independent Assessment Framework, Section: Assessor Responsibilities.

This question addresses valid implementations ofControl 2.9: Transaction Business Controlsunder theSwift Customer Security Controls Framework (CSCF) v2024, which focuses on detecting and preventing fraudulent transactions.

Step 1: Understand Control 2.9 Transaction Business Controls

Control 2.9 requires Swift users to implement measures to validate transaction flows against expected business patterns, aiming to detect anomalies that could indicate fraud or error. TheCSCF v2024emphasizes flexibility in implementation, provided the controls mitigate identified risks effectively.

Step 2: Evaluate Each Option

A. Multiple measures must be implemented by the Swift user to validate the flows of transactions are in the bounds of the normal expected businessTheCSCF v2024, underControl 2.9, mandates the use of multiple detection measures (e.g., transaction monitoring, threshold limits, anomaly detection) to ensure transaction flows align with normal business expectations. This multi-layered approach is essential to address diverse fraud risks.Conclusion: This is correct.

B. A customer designed implementation or a combination of different measures are deemed valid if they sufficiently mitigate the control risksTheCSCF v2024allows flexibility in how users implement Control 2.9, permitting custom solutions or combinations of measures (e.g., AI-based monitoring, manual reviews) as long as they effectively mitigate the risks identified in the user’s risk assessment. This is supported by theSwift CSP FAQon control customization.Conclusion: This is correct.

C. Reliance on a recent business assessment or regulator response confirming the effectiveness of the control (as an example CPMI's requirement) is especially poignant to this controlWhile a business assessment or regulator input (e.g., CPMI-IOSCO guidelines) can inform the implementation, Control 2.9 requires the user to implement specific measures, not just rely on external validations. TheCSCF v2024does not allow sole dependence on such assessments; users must demonstrate their own controls.Conclusion: This is incorrect.

D. Any solution is acceptable so long as the CISO approves the implementationTheCSCF v2024requires that implementations meet objective criteria for risk mitigation, not just internal approval by the Chief Information Security Officer (CISO). The independent assessment must validate effectiveness, not just rely on CISO endorsement.Conclusion: This is incorrect.

Step 3: Conclusion and Verification

The verified answers areAandB, as they align with the requirements and flexibility ofControl 2.9 Transaction Business Controlsin theCSCF v2024, ensuring robust and tailored transaction validation.

References

Swift Customer Security Controls Framework (CSCF) v2024, Control 2.9: Transaction Business Controls.

Swift CSP FAQ, Section: Control Implementation Flexibility.

Swift Security Best Practices, Section: Transaction Monitoring.

This question relates to Control 5.2 – Token Management in the CSCF, which outlines requirements for managing physical or software-based tokens used for authentication or cryptographic operations in the SWIFT environment. Let’s evaluate each option:

A. Similar to user accounts, individual assignment and ownership for accurate traceability and revocation in case of potential tampering, loss or in case of user role change

CSCF Control 5.2 mandates that tokens (e.g., HSM tokens or software tokens) be uniquely assigned to individuals to ensure traceability and accountability. This allows for revocation in cases of tampering, loss, or role changes, mirroring user account management principles under Control 5.1 – Logical Access Control.

SWIFT PKI certificates are critical for securing communications and require a formal request process to SWIFT for issuance or renewal. Let’s evaluate each option:

•Option A: Using both online and offline methods

This is correct. SWIFT provides multiple channels for submitting PKI certificate requests to accommodate different customer needs and security requirements. The online method involves submitting requests through the SWIFT Alliance Web Platform or SWIFT’s customer portal, where users can generate and upload certificate signing requests (CSRs). The offline method involves physical submission, such as sending a signed request via secure mail or courier, often used for initial setups or high-security environments. SWIFT documentation confirms both methods are supported, aligning with CSCF Control "1.3 Cryptographic Failover" for secure certificate management.

•Option B: Using an online method

This is incorrect as a standalone answer. While the online method is available and widely used, it is not the only method. Excluding the offline option does not reflect SWIFT’s flexible process.

•Option C: Using an offline method

This is incorrect as a standalone answer. The offline method is an option, but it is not the only method. SWIFT supports both approaches depending on the customer’s infrastructure and security policies.

•Option D: None of the above

This is incorrect. Both online and offline methods are valid, making this option invalid.

Summary of Correct Answer:

PKI certificate requests can be submitted to SWIFT using both online and offline methods (A), providing flexibility and security.

References to SWIFT Customer Security Programme Documents:

•SWIFT Customer Security Controls Framework (CSCF) v2024: Control 1.3 supports secure certificate request processes.

•SWIFT PKI Management Guide: Details online and offline submission methods for certificate requests.

•SWIFT Alliance Documentation: Confirms dual submission channels for PKI certificates.

This question explores the process for updating an attestation after remediating an exception identified by an assessor:

Step 1: CSP Attestation and Remediation Process

The SWIFT CSP requires users to submit an annual attestation via the KYC Security Attestation (KYC-SA) application, reflecting compliance with CSCF controls. If anexception (non-compliance) is reported, remediation must occur, followed by validation before updating the attestation.

Alliance Access (SAA) is a SWIFT product used by financial institutions to manage the creation, processing, and transmission of SWIFT messages. In the context of the SWIFT Customer Security Programme (CSP), we need to classify its role within the SWIFT architecture:

•Option A: A Messaging Interface

This is correct. Alliance Access is classified as a messaging interface in SWIFT terminology. It allows users to create, validate, and send SWIFT messages (e.g., FIN MT messages like MT103 for payments) and receive incoming messages. It interfaces with the institution’s back-office systems and connects to the SWIFT network via a communication interface like Alliance Gateway (SAG). The CSCF categorizes components like Alliance Access as messaging interfaces, as they handle the business logic of message processing, and applies specific controls (e.g., "2.1 Internal Data Transmission Security") to secure these interfaces.

•Option B: A Communication Interface

This is incorrect. A communication interface in SWIFT terminology refers to components like Alliance Gateway (SAG), which manage the network-level connectivity to SWIFTNet via SwiftNet Link (SNL). Alliance Access does not handle network connectivity directly; it relies on SAG for this purpose. Alliance Access focuses on message creation and processing, not communication with the SWIFT network.

•Option C: A SWIFT Connector

This is incorrect. The term "SWIFT Connector" is not a standard classification in the CSP or SWIFT documentation. It might refer to integration tools like the SWIFT Integration Layer (SIL) used in cloud deployments, but Alliance Access does not fit this category. Alliance Access is a full-fledged messaging interface, not a connector.

•Option D: A Secure Server

This is incorrect. While Alliance Access operates on a server and must be secured as per CSCF controls (e.g., "2.3 System Hardening"), it is not classified as a "secure server." This term is too vague and does not reflect Alliance Access’s specific role as a messaging interface.

Summary of Correct Answer:

Alliance Access is a messaging interface (A), responsible for creating, processing, and managing SWIFT messages within the CSP framework.

References to SWIFT Customer Security Programme Documents:

•SWIFT Customer Security Controls Framework (CSCF) v2024: Classifies Alliance Access as a messaging interface (Control 2.1).

•SWIFT Alliance Access Documentation: Describes its role in message creation and processing.

•SWIFT Architecture Glossary: Distinguishes messaging interfaces (e.g., Alliance Access) from communication interfaces (e.g., Alliance Gateway).

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