Practice Free 212-89 EC Council Certified Incident Handler (ECIH v3) Exam Questions Answers With Explanation

This scenario represents a failure in the Preparation phase of the Incident Handling and Response (IH&R) lifecycle as defined by the EC-Council ECIH curriculum. Preparation focuses on establishing policies, procedures, standards, and awareness programs that define how systems and data must be used and protected. In this case, employees were sharing credentials via unauthorized channels because the organization failed to provide explicit rules governing acceptable communication practices.

Option C is correct because establishing defined protocols for approved digital channels directly addresses the root cause. ECIH emphasizes that organizations must define acceptable use policies, secure communication standards, and data handling procedures before incidents occur. These controls reduce the likelihood of human error and insider misuse by setting clear expectations and enforceable boundaries.

Option A relates to physical surveillance risks, which are unrelated to credential sharing. Option B is a recovery-focused control and does not prevent misuse. Option D is a detection mechanism that cannot compensate for missing governance controls.

By defining approved channels and educating users on their proper use, organizations significantly reduce the probability of credential leakage and insider-driven incidents, fulfilling a core ECIH preparation requirement.

According to the EC-Council Incident Handler (ECIH) curriculum, an unauthorized access incident occurs when an attacker gains access to a system without proper authorization, often through credential compromise, brute-force attacks, or exploitation of weak authentication controls.

The scenario describes repeated failed login attempts followed by successful access and subsequent data exfiltration. This sequence—brute-force attempts leading to compromise and data transmission—clearly indicates unauthorized system access. The large outbound traffic spike to an unfamiliar IP further confirms potential data exfiltration following successful authentication bypass.

Option A is unrelated to wireless-specific attacks. Option C refers to policy misuse by authorized users. Option D (denial-of-service) focuses on service disruption rather than data theft or credential compromise.

ECIH recommends immediate isolation of affected systems, log preservation, credential resets, forensic analysis, and review of access controls following unauthorized access incidents. Maria’s actions align with these best practices.

Therefore, this incident is classified as an unauthorized access incident.

As of my last update, the most recent NIST standard for incident response was NIST Special Publication 800-61 Revision 2 (800-61r2), titled "Computer Security Incident Handling Guide." This document provides guidelines for establishing an effective incident response program, including preparation, detection and analysis, containment, eradication, recovery, and post-incident activity.

Explanation (aligned to IH&R best practice):

Insider threats are most effectively reduced by combining least privilege with continuous detection of abnormal behavior. Regular access reviews ensure that users only retain permissions needed for their roles (reducing “privilege creep”), while behavior analytics help detect misuse that still occurs within “legitimate” access. Password rotation (A) is largely hygiene and does not prevent a determined insider who already has authorized access; frequent forced changes can also push unsafe behaviors (writing passwords down, predictable patterns). A strict hierarchy (B) is not practical and does not map to “need-to-know”—seniority is not the right control boundary, job function is. Biometrics (C) strengthens authentication, but the scenario’s problem is not identity uncertainty; it is misuse by a valid insider. The most effective approach is therefore governance + monitoring: (1) define data access baselines, (2) review permissions routinely, (3) alert on suspicious actions such as unusual repository cloning, bulk downloads, access outside normal hours, or atypical branches, and (4) investigate quickly with HR/legal processes. These measures directly address motive-driven misuse by enabling early detection and limiting the blast radius. This aligns with the broader incident handling emphasis on identifying affected systems/data, understanding scope, and improving controls post-incident to prevent recurrence.

In the context of information security, the Incident Manager (IM) plays a crucial role in handling incidents from both a management and technical perspective. The Incident Manager is responsible for overseeing the entire incident response process, coordinating with relevant stakeholders, ensuring that incidents are analyzed, contained, and eradicated efficiently, and that recovery processes are initiated promptly. They are pivotal in ensuring communication flows smoothly between technical teams and upper management and that all actions taken are aligned with the organization's broader security policies and objectives. Unlike network administrators, threat researchers, or forensic investigators who may play more specialized roles within the incident response process, the Incident Manager has a broad oversight role that encompasses both technical and managerial aspects to ensure a comprehensive and coordinated response to security incidents.

This incident involves malware actively impacting medical devices, posing patient safety risks. According to ECIH malware incident handling principles, the first priority is containment and eradication at the endpoint level.

Option D is correct because deploying endpoint protection directly detects and halts malware execution on the MRI machines, stopping both manipulation of results and further malicious activity. Endpoint containment is essential before network-level or recovery actions.

Option B addresses communication but does not stop local manipulation. Option C alters system state without containment. Option A is a regulatory step that follows validation.

ECIH emphasizes that in critical infrastructure and healthcare environments, immediate endpoint containment is essential to protect safety and data integrity.

This scenario involves an active malware incident affecting content integrity, which directly impacts public trust and organizational credibility. According to the ECIH malware response lifecycle, the first priority is containment, not correction or recovery.

Option B is correct because network segregation and isolation prevent the malware from continuing to spread, communicating with command-and-control infrastructure, or further manipulating content. Containment stabilizes the environment and preserves evidence for forensic analysis.

Option C focuses on correction rather than stopping the attack and may allow malware persistence. Option D risks restoring infected components and destroying forensic artifacts. Option A is a communication decision that should follow containment and validation.

ECIH explicitly warns against performing remediation or rollback actions before containment, as doing so may worsen impact or obscure root cause analysis. Isolating compromised systems is therefore the correct immediate response.

The Volatility framework is a widely used tool for analyzing volatile memory (RAM) dumps. It is especially useful in digital forensics and malware analysis. One of the fundamental tasks in memory analysis is to list the processes that were running on the system at the time the memory dump was taken. Thepslistcommand in the Volatility framework serves this purpose by listing all processes from the process list in memory, which can provide valuable insights into what was happening on the system, including the presence of any malicious processes.

The syntax provided in the answer option corresponds to the usage of thepslistcommand with the Volatility tool, specifying the memory dump file to be analyzed (-f /root/Desktop/memdump.mem) and the profile of the system from which the dump was taken (--profile=Win2008SP1x86). This information is crucial for accurate analysis, as the profile helps Volatility interpret the memory structures correctly.

Behavioral analysis is a technique used to detect insider threats by analyzing the behavior of employees, both individually and in group settings, to identify any actions that deviate from the norm. This method relies on monitoring and analyzing data related to user activities, access patterns, and other behaviors that could indicate malicious intent or a potential security risk from within the organization. Behavioral analysis can detect unusual access to sensitive data, abnormal data transfer activities, and other indicators of insider threats. This approach is proactive and can help in identifying potential insider threats before they result in significant harm to the organization.

The EC-Council Incident Handler (ECIH) curriculum categorizes incidents such as unauthorized software installation and policy violations under inappropriate usage incidents. In this scenario, the activity originated from a legitimate internal workstation and user account, not an external third party.

The repeated login failures outside business hours combined with installation of an unauthorized remote desktop tool indicate a breach of acceptable use policy and potentially malicious intent. However, the key factor is that the actions were performed by an internal user using valid access credentials, making this an insider-related policy violation rather than an external unauthorized access attack.

Option A implies legitimate remote work within policy boundaries, which is contradicted by the unauthorized software installation. Option B suggests a third-party compromise, but logs indicate activity from an internal user account. Option D (DoS attack) involves service disruption via traffic flooding, which is not described here.

ECIH stresses enforcing acceptable use policies, monitoring user behavior, restricting unauthorized software installation, and applying least privilege controls to mitigate insider misuse. Therefore, this scenario best fits inappropriate usage due to policy violation and unauthorized software installation.

In the context of digital evidence investigation, volatility refers to how quickly data can change or be lost when power is removed or systems are altered. Among the options provided, cache is the most volatile because it is temporary storage that is designed to speed up access to data and is frequently overwritten. Cache data resides in RAM and includes things like memory buffers, system and network information, and process execution data, which are lost upon reboot or power loss. This contrasts with disks, emails, and temp files, which are considered less volatile because they are stored on permanent or semi-permanent media and are less likely to be immediately lost or overwritten.

While technical solutions like antivirus updates, disabling HTML in emails, and web proxy filtering play significant roles in securing email systems, the best method to prevent email incidents is often considered to be end-user training. This is because many email threats, such as phishing, rely on exploiting user behavior rather than technical vulnerabilities. By educating users on the risks associated with suspicious emails, how to recognize potentially harmful messages, and the importance of not clicking on unknown links or attachments, organizations can significantly reduce the risk of email-related incidents. End-user training empowers individuals to act as a critical line of defense against email-based threats, complementing technical safeguards.

Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) is a framework used to manage digital certificates and public-key encryption. It enables secure electronic transfer of information for a range of network activities such as e-commerce, internet banking, and confidential email. PKI is fundamental to the management of encryption keys and digital certificates, ensuring the secure exchange of data over networks and verification of identity.

A negligent insider is an individual within an organization who, due to a lack of knowledge on security threats or in an attempt to increase workplace efficiency, inadvertently bypasses security procedures or makes errors that compromise security. This type of insider threat is not malicious in intent; rather, it stems from carelessness, oversight, or a lack of proper security training. Such insiders might click on phishing links, mishandle sensitive information, or use unsecured networks for work-related tasks, thereby exposing the organization to potential security breaches. This contrasts with compromised insiders (who are manipulated by external parties), professional insiders (who misuse their access for personal gain), and malicious insiders (who intentionally aim to harm the organization).

This question focuses on post-incident recovery and resilience, a key ECIH concept. After restoring services, organizations must strengthen defenses to prevent recurrence.

Option B is correct because Content Delivery Networks (CDNs) distribute traffic and absorb volumetric attacks, while blackhole routing discards malicious traffic upstream. ECIH identifies these as industry-standard controls for DDoS resilience.

Options A, C, and D weaken security or increase attack surface and contradict ECIH guidance.

ECIH stresses that recovery is not complete until preventive measures are implemented. CDN deployment and upstream traffic control significantly improve availability during future attacks.

In a disassociation attack, the attacker sends disassociation frames to a wireless access point (AP) using a spoofed MAC address of a client or to the client pretending to be the AP. This forces the target to disconnect and often reconnect, causing a disruption in the wireless connectivity. Such attacks can be used to create a denial-of-service condition for the client, making the network resource unavailable. The primary objective of this attack is not to eavesdrop but to disrupt the normal operation of the wireless connection between the client and the AP.

In healthcare environments, endpoint security incidents have direct implications for patient safety and care delivery. The ECIH Endpoint Security module stresses that endpoint incident handling is critical not only for data protection but also for maintaining essential services.

Option A is correct because healthcare organizations depend on endpoint availability for diagnostics, treatment, and patient records. Ransomware that disrupts endpoints can delay care, endanger patients, and cause cascading operational failures. ECIH highlights that maintaining business and operational continuity is the primary driver for robust endpoint response in critical sectors.

Options B and D are important considerations but are secondary outcomes of the incident. Option C is unnecessary and impractical as an immediate rationale.

ECIH consistently emphasizes that in sectors like healthcare, endpoint IH&R frameworks exist first and foremost to ensure uninterrupted service delivery, making Option A correct.

Persistent mobile malware that survives antivirus scans indicates deep system compromise. The ECIH Endpoint and Mobile Incident Handling guidance states that when malware cannot be reliably removed, reimaging or OS reinstallation is the safest remediation.

Option C is correct because performing a factory reset or reinstalling the OS ensures complete removal of malicious components and restores device integrity. ECIH cautions that partial containment actions may stop symptoms but not eradicate threats.

Options A and B are temporary containment steps. Option D is ineffective against malware.

Therefore, full OS reinstallation is the correct next action.

The responsibility of first responders does not include shutting down or rebooting the victim’s computer as a measure to preserve temporary and fragile evidence. In fact, such actions can potentially alter or destroy volatile data that could be crucial for the investigation. The primary responsibilities of first responders include protecting and identifying the crime scene, and ensuring the preservation of evidence in its original state as much as possible, which may involve isolating affected systems from the network but not necessarily shutting them down or rebooting them without proper forensic readiness and consideration.

Wireshark is a widely used network protocol analyzer that helps in capturing and interactively browsing the traffic on a network. It is an essential tool for incident responders like Eric who are developing incident-handling plans and procedures. By analyzing network traffic, Wireshark allows users to see what is happening on their network at a microscopic level, making it invaluable for troubleshooting network problems, analyzing security incidents, and understanding network behavior. Whois is used for querying databases that store registered users or assignees of an Internet resource. Burp Suite is a tool for testing web application security, and FaceNiff is used for session hijacking within a WiFi network, which makes Wireshark the best choice for analyzing network traffic.

The correct sequence of steps performed by incident responders during the vulnerability assessment phase is as follows:

Perform OSINT information gathering to validate the vulnerabilities (4):Initially, Open Source Intelligence (OSINT) is used to gather information about the organization’s digital footprint and potential vulnerabilities.

Run vulnerability scans using tools (1):Next, specialized tools are employed to scan the organization's networks and systems for vulnerabilities.

Identify and prioritize vulnerabilities (2):The identified vulnerabilities are then analyzed and prioritized based on their severity and potential impact on the organization.

Examine and evaluate physical security (3):Physical security assessments are also crucial as they can impact the overall security posture and protection of digital assets.

Check for misconfigurations and human errors (6):This step involves looking for misconfigurations in systems and networks, as well as potential human errors that could lead to vulnerabilities.

Apply business and technology context to scanner results (5):The results from the scans are evaluated within the context of the business and its technology environment to accurately assess risks.

Create a vulnerability scan report (7):Finally, a comprehensive report is created, detailing the vulnerabilities, their severity, and recommended mitigation strategies.

This sequence ensures a thorough assessment, prioritizing vulnerabilities that pose the greatest risk and providing actionable insights for mitigation.

In incident response protocols, incidents are categorized based on their severity, impact, and the urgency of the response required. The categorization helps in prioritizing incident response activities and allocating resources accordingly. A CAT 1 (Category 1) incident is typically considered the highest priority, involving significant threats that require immediate response. Given the scenario where a malware incident in one of the largest social network companies must be reported within 1 hour of discovery/detection, this indicates a high-priority incident due to the potential widespread impact and the need for a rapid response to contain and mitigate the malware's spread. The urgency of the reporting timeframe suggests that the incident is considered critical, aligning with the characteristics of a CAT 1 incident, which necessitates immediate action to prevent significant damage or disruption to the company's operations and services.

Explanation (incident response governance):

This scenario combines data theft + extortion involving highly sensitive IP and regulated participant data. The prudent course is to trigger formal legal/incident governance: engage law enforcement and appropriate cybercrime agencies (D), preserve evidence, and coordinate with legal counsel, regulators (if required), and cyber-insurance response processes. Law enforcement engagement can support intelligence sharing, preservation orders, and broader investigation into the infrastructure receiving the exfiltrated data.

(A) recalling the drug is not directly tied to the incident’s immediate technical or legal response; it’s a business decision that may be unnecessary and harmful without evidence of counterfeit risk. (B) immediate public announcement may be legally required in some jurisdictions, but it must be accurate and coordinated; doing it prematurely can worsen harm. (C) negotiation is risky and typically handled only through controlled legal and executive channels; it does not ensure data return and can incentivize further extortion.

Thus, (D) reflects best-practice escalation: treat it as a serious crime, preserve chain of custody, and coordinate response through legal and investigative authorities while technical teams contain and scope.

This scenario requires stealthy containment, a technique emphasized in ECIH when dealing with advanced threats, particularly in OT environments.

Option A is correct because disabling selective services while maintaining passive monitoring restricts attacker movement without tipping them off. ECIH stresses that premature disruption can cause attackers to destroy evidence or accelerate damage.

Options B, C, and D are noisy actions that alert the adversary and risk operational disruption.

ECIH recommends low-profile containment for advanced and persistent threats, especially in critical infrastructure, making Option A the correct response.

SSRF vulnerabilities allow attackers to coerce a server into making unauthorized internal or external requests. The ECIH Web Application Security module states that controlling outbound traffic is the most effective mitigation against SSRF.

Option D is correct because restricting outbound traffic ensures that even if an SSRF flaw exists, the server cannot access internal resources or attacker-controlled endpoints. ECIH emphasizes network-level egress filtering as a primary defensive control for SSRF.

Option A reduces attack surface but does not stop exploitation. Option B addresses client-side risks, not server-side requests. Option C improves detection but does not prevent exploitation.

Thus, outbound traffic restriction is the priority mitigation measure.

High Orbit Ion Cannon (HOIC) is a tool designed to perform stress testing on networks or servers. It can launch a Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) attack by enabling an attacker to overwhelm a target with HTTP POST and GET requests. HOIC's distinctive feature is its ability to attack multiple targets (up to 256 URLs simultaneously) with configurable HTTP flood attacks. This capability makes it a preferred choice for attackers aiming to disrupt services on a large scale. Unlike tools designed for debugging or vulnerability scanning (e.g., IDA Pro, Ollydbg, OpenVAS), HOIC is specifically crafted for launching DoS/DDoS attacks, making it the correct answer for Dash's objective.

MxToolbox is a comprehensive tool designed for analyzing email headers and diagnosing various email delivery issues. When Francis received a spoofed email asking for his bank information, using MxToolbox to analyze the email headers would be appropriate. This tool helps in examining the source of the email, tracking the email's path across the internet from the sender to the receiver, and identifying any signs of email spoofing or malicious activity. It provides detailed information about the email servers encountered along the way and can help in verifying the authenticity of the email sender. Other options like EventLog Analyzer, Email Checker, and PoliteMail are tools used for different purposes such as analyzing system event logs, checking email address validity, and managing email communications, respectively, and do not specifically focus on analyzing email headers to the extent required for investigating a spoofed email incident.

In the practice of digital forensics and incident handling, evidence bags play a crucial role in preserving the integrity and chain of custody of physical and digital evidence. The information typically included in the documentation on evidence bags encompasses the date and time of seizure, which provides a timestamp for when the evidence was collected; the exhibit number, which is a unique identifier assigned to each piece of evidence for tracking and reference purposes; and the name of the incident responder or individual who collected the evidence, ensuring accountability and traceability. This documentation is essential for maintaining the chain of custody, a critical element in legal proceedings, as it helps establish the evidence's authenticity and integrity by detailing its handling from collection to presentation in court. Options A, B, and C describe types of digital evidence but are not directly related to the content typically documented on evidence bags.

ISO/IEC 27001 Annex A.16 focuses on information security incident management, including reporting, assessment, response, and learning. The ECIH curriculum aligns closely with these requirements, emphasizing structured procedures and continuous improvement.

Option C is correct because it directly addresses the identified gaps: clear escalation channels, consistent outcome tracking, and incorporation of lessons learned. ECIH stresses that post-incident activities—often overlooked—are essential for improving readiness and preventing recurrence.

Option A supports preparedness but does not address systemic process gaps. Option B improves visibility but not governance. Option D is a technical control unrelated to incident learning and escalation.

Thus, implementing structured incident escalation and post-incident knowledge integration is the priority action for compliance and resilience.

In the described attack, where attackers pose as legitimate access points (APs) by beaconing the WLAN's SSID to lure users, the attack is known as an Evil twin AP attack. This type of attack involves setting up a rogue AP with the same SSID as a legitimate wireless access point, making it appear as an authorized network to users. Unsuspecting users may connect to this malicious AP, allowing attackers to intercept sensitive information, conduct man-in-the-middle attacks, or distribute malware. The Evil twin AP attack exploits the trust users have in known SSIDs to compromise their security.

A Trojan, or Trojan horse, is a type of malware that disguises itself as a legitimate, harmless program or file to trick users into downloading and installing it. Once activated, a Trojan can perform a range of malicious activities, including giving attackers unauthorized access to the infected system. This can lead to the theft of sensitive information, such as credit card numbers and passwords, and can also allow the attacker to install additional malware, potentially leading to further damage, such as the erasure of data. Unlike viruses and worms, Trojans do not replicate themselves but rely on the deception of users to spread.

The data preprocessing step performed by Johnson, where he analyzes user activities within a certain time period to create time-ordered domain sequences for further analysis on sequential patterns, is known as user-specific sessionization. This process involves aggregating all user activities and requests into discrete sessions based on the individual user, allowing for a coherent analysis of user behavior over time. This is critical for identifying patterns that may indicate a watering hole attack, where attackers compromise a site frequently visited by the target group to distribute malware. User-specific sessionization helps in isolating and examining sequences of actions taken by users, making it easier to detect anomalies or patterns indicative of such an attack.

ECIH prioritizes containment of the most critical threat vector. The primary server actively exfiltrating data represents the highest risk.

Option B is correct because isolating the primary server immediately stops data loss and attacker control. IoT remediation can follow once core assets are secured.

Options A and D delay containment. Option C causes unnecessary disruption.

ECIH stresses that responders must address the most damaging threat first, making Option B correct.

The ECIH Forensic Readiness module defines chain of custody as a documented trail showing who collected, handled, transferred, and stored evidence. Maintaining this record is essential for legal admissibility.

Option C is correct because Liam’s actions—labeling, logging, photographing, and documenting custody transfers—directly establish and maintain chain of custody. ECIH stresses that without proper chain-of-custody documentation, evidence may be challenged or dismissed in legal proceedings.

Options A, B, and D are unrelated to evidence tracking.

Thus, Liam is demonstrating proper chain-of-custody management.

In the context of an incident response team, the role of an internal auditor like David includes identifying, evaluating, and reporting on information security risks and vulnerabilities within the organization. His responsibility is to ensure that the organization's security controls are effective and to identify any security loopholes that could be exploited by attackers. Once identified, he reports these vulnerabilities to management so that they can take the necessary actions to mitigate the risks. This role is critical in maintaining theorganization's overall security posture and ensuring compliance with relevant laws, regulations, and policies.

ECIH forensic readiness guidance identifies the Windows Registry as a primary source for USB device artifacts. The Enum\USB registry key stores vendor IDs, product IDs, serial numbers, and connection history.

Option A is correct because it provides direct evidence of which USB devices were connected, when they were installed, and on which system—critical for insider investigations.

Option B cannot reliably identify physical USB usage. Option C contains driver installation data but is less comprehensive. Option D is irrelevant.

Registry analysis is a foundational forensic technique in ECIH, making Option A correct.

The EC-Council Incident Handler (ECIH) curriculum explains that email account compromise often involves attackers creating persistent mechanisms such as auto-forwarding rules, mailbox delegation changes, or hidden inbox rules to exfiltrate data even after password resets.

In this scenario, unauthorized message redirection continued despite credential resets and session termination. This strongly indicates the presence of malicious mailbox configuration changes, specifically auto-forwarding rules sending copies of emails to external attacker-controlled addresses.

ECIH emphasizes that eradication requires removal of persistence mechanisms—not just resetting credentials. During email security incident eradication, responders must review mailbox rules, forwarding settings, API tokens, and delegated access permissions. Attackers frequently create hidden rules to maintain access to sensitive communications.

Option A (auditing logs) supports investigation but does not eliminate persistence. Option B (credential resets) is a containment measure already performed but insufficient alone. Option C (client advisory messages) is part of communication management, not technical eradication.

Deleting malicious auto-forwarding rules directly neutralizes the attacker’s ongoing access channel and aligns with ECIH’s guidance on removing unauthorized configurations, validating account integrity, enforcing MFA, and auditing cloud email security settings.

Therefore, deleting malicious auto-forwarding rules is the most appropriate eradication step in this scenario.

Network forensic tools are designed to capture, record, and analyze network traffic. Tools like Capsa Network Analyzer, Tcpdump, and Wireshark are specifically designed for this purpose, providing capabilities to capture live traffic, analyze packets, and understand network activities. Capsa Network Analyzer is a comprehensive network monitoring tool, Tcpdump is a powerful command-line packet analyzer, and Wireshark is a widely used network protocol analyzer that provides detailed information about network traffic.

Advanced NTFS Journaling Parser, on the other hand, is not a network forensic tool but a tool used for forensic analysis of NTFS file systems. It parses the NTFS journal ($LogFile), which contains a log of changes made to files on an NTFS volume. This tool is valuable for forensic analysts who are investigating the file system activities on a Windows system, such as file creation, modification, and deletion times, rather than analyzing network traffic. Therefore, it does not fit the category of a network forensic tool.

Anti-forensics techniques are designed to prevent, mislead, or interfere with the incident handling process, affecting the collection, preservation, and identification phases of the forensic investigation process. These techniques include methods to erase, encrypt, or alter information, make data recovery difficult, hide data (e.g., steganography), or otherwise obstruct forensic analysis and investigation efforts. Anti-forensics can significantly challenge the efforts of incident responders and forensic investigators in establishing the facts of a security incident or crime.

The EC-Council Incident Handler (ECIH) curriculum defines Post-Incident Activity as the phase focused on lessons learned, root cause analysis, and process improvement. Conducting a formal retrospective with cross-functional stakeholders to reconstruct timelines, evaluate decision-making, and identify coordination gaps aligns directly with a structured postmortem analysis.

ECIH emphasizes that post-incident reviews should promote a no-blame culture to encourage transparency and honest feedback. The objective is continuous improvement of incident response playbooks, communication protocols, escalation procedures, and overall organizational readiness. Root cause analysis (RCA) is a key component, ensuring that both technical and procedural weaknesses are identified and corrected.

Option B (reclassification) is an administrative adjustment, not a comprehensive review. Option C (vendor notification) relates to external communication. Option D (checklist updates) may result from the review but does not describe the primary activity being executed.

Therefore, the organization is performing a formal postmortem to analyze root causes and operational effectiveness.

Rachel is applying the forensic principle of preserving volatile and screen-based digital evidence, which is a core concept in the ECIH First Response and Digital Forensics modules. When a mobile device is powered on and unlocked, the data visible on the screen—such as messages, timestamps, sender details, and session states—constitutes volatile evidence that may be lost permanently if the device locks, reboots, or powers off.

ECIH guidance instructs first responders to document the live state of a device before any interaction that could alter its condition. Photographing the screen captures evidence that may not be recoverable later due to encryption or session expiration. Maintaining power ensures the device does not enter a locked or encrypted state during transport.

Option A refers to forensic analysis, not first response. Option C would destroy evidence and violates forensic principles. Option D risks loss of volatile data.

Preserving screen-based evidence ensures integrity, admissibility, and continuity of evidence, making Option B correct.

The EC-Council Incident Handler (ECIH) curriculum explains that insider threat investigations frequently depend on endpoint monitoring and user behavior analytics (UBA/UEBA). In this case, the Nuix Adaptive Security tool captured screenshots, file metadata, and keystroke logs—forms of host-level monitoring that directly observe user activity on the endpoint.

User behavior analytics focuses on detecting deviations from normal patterns, such as sending attachments to unknown external addresses during non-business hours. ECIH identifies this as anomalous insider behavior indicative of potential data exfiltration. Endpoint monitoring tools provide detailed artifacts including screen captures, application usage logs, keystroke records, and file transfer metadata, which are critical for forensic analysis and evidence preservation.

Option B (SIEM event correlation) aggregates logs from multiple systems but does not typically capture screenshots or keystroke-level data. Option C (network forensics) focuses on packet captures and traffic analysis rather than user-level interaction evidence. Option D (host-based intrusion prevention systems) primarily block or detect malicious activity but do not provide comprehensive behavioral monitoring data like screenshots and keystroke logs.

ECIH emphasizes that insider threat cases rely heavily on behavioral indicators, digital activity reconstruction, and endpoint telemetry to determine intent and scope. Lina’s reliance on user activity reconstruction and endpoint-level artifacts clearly aligns with user behavior analytics and endpoint monitoring.

Therefore, the correct answer is User behavior analytics and endpoint monitoring.

ECIH cloud incident handling guidance emphasizes that containment must be immediate and within the organization’s control. Modifying cloud security groups allows responders to restrict network access instantly, preventing further data exfiltration.

Option D is correct because it is actionable without CSP dependency and directly limits attacker movement. Option A may take time. Option B is investigative. Option C is regulatory and premature.

Containment through security group modification is therefore the most critical first step.

This scenario highlights recovery challenges specific to IoT environments, which are addressed in the ECIH Endpoint and IoT Incident Handling modules. IoT systems generate continuous streams of operational data, configuration states, and control commands that are essential for accurate recovery after disruption.

Option D is correct because maintaining synchronized cloud replicas of critical IoT resources ensures near-real-time availability of sensor data, device configurations, and control logic. ECIH emphasizes that traditional periodic backups are often insufficient for IoT and OT systems due to their dynamic and state-dependent nature. Cloud replication supports faster, more complete restoration and reduces data gaps.

Options A, B, and C rely on static or delayed backup mechanisms that cannot capture the operational state required to restore IoT systems accurately. Tape archives and external drives introduce latency and risk data loss, while ZIP archives lack synchronization.

ECIH recovery guidance stresses resilience and continuity, particularly for operational technology. Continuous replication is therefore the most effective strategy.

This incident is a classic spear phishing attack, where a targeted individual is deceived into entering credentials on a fraudulent login page. The ECIH Email Security module describes spear phishing as highly targeted and often tailored to specific roles, such as executives.

Option D is correct because the CFO was targeted with a convincing fake Microsoft 365 login prompt, leading to credential theft. The use of valid credentials afterward confirms successful social engineering rather than technical exploitation.

Option A involves email flooding. Option B redirects traffic via DNS manipulation. Option C targets mobile messaging platforms.

Recognizing spear phishing is critical because it informs remediation steps such as credential resets, MFA enforcement, and executive awareness training, all emphasized in ECIH guidance.

The described attack is a "Watering hole" attack. This type of attack targets specific groups of users by infecting websites they are known to frequently visit. The attacker first identifies websites that are popular with the target group, then finds vulnerabilities in those websites to inject malicious code. When the victims visit the compromised site, the code redirects them to other sites or automatically downloads malware onto their machines. This attack leverages the trust users have in regularly visited sites to distribute malware. Unlike obfuscation application, directory traversal, or cookie/session poisoning attacks, watering hole attacks specifically aim to compromise a commonly used and trusted website to target its users.

In the scenario where Dolphin Investment needs to implement a ticketing system for employees like Jacob to report IT-related issues, ManageEngine ServiceDesk Plus is the most suitable option among the choices provided. ManageEngine ServiceDesk Plus is a comprehensive IT help desk software that facilitates issue tracking, incident management, and efficient resolution of IT-related problems and requests. It enables users to submit tickets through various channels, including email, web portal, phone, or chat, and allows IT support teams to manage these tickets through a centralized platform. This system is designed to streamline the process of reporting, tracking, and resolving IT issues and incidents, making it an ideal solution for organizations looking to establish a formalized incident reporting and resolution process. Other options like IBM X-Force Exchange, ThreatConnect, and MISP focus more on threat intelligence sharing and security incident analysis rather than functioning as an IT help desk or ticketing system.

This incident involves adaptive malware embedded within an AI system, actively evolving its behavior. The ECIH malware incident handling methodology prioritizes containment and eradication of the threat before recovery actions. Restoring data without removing the malware risks immediate reinfection and continued manipulation.

Option B is correct because deploying the AI-security module directly targets the malware’s adaptive mechanisms, allowing responders to detect, contain, and eradicate the malicious logic within the AI environment. ECIH emphasizes using appropriate, context-aware security controls that match the technology stack involved in the incident. For AI-driven environments, specialized tools are necessary to counter threats that traditional controls may not detect.

Option A is premature and unsafe prior to eradication. Option C disrupts business operations without resolving the threat. Option D is a communication step that should follow containment and validation.

Therefore, neutralizing the evolved malware using the AI-security module is the correct primary step.

In the scenario described, Stanley aims to ensure that the digital evidence he collected is admissible in court. This means the evidence must be gathered, handled, and presented in a manner that complies with legal standards, ensuring it can be legally used in a trial. Admissibility is a crucial characteristic of digital evidence, as it must be relevant, authentic, and obtained without violating any laws or rights to privacy. The evidence must also be presented in a clear and comprehensible manner to be understood by the members of the jury, which further supports its admissibility in court.

Unauthorized access to backend services in a cloud environment most commonly results from overly permissive identity and access management (IAM) configurations. The ECIH cloud incident handling guidance emphasizes that identity controls are the primary security boundary in cloud platforms.

Option A is correct because reviewing and tightening IAM roles immediately reduces the attack surface and revokes excessive privileges that may be exploited. This action directly addresses the root cause of unauthorized access.

Option D is a strong additional control but should be applied after correcting IAM misconfigurations. Option B improves future detection but does not contain the current incident. Option C is disruptive and unnecessary as a first response.

Therefore, IAM review and privilege tightening is the correct first measure, consistent with ECIH best practices.

The EC-Council Incident Handler (ECIH) curriculum stresses the importance of maintaining evidence integrity during recovery operations. Documenting the chain of custody ensures that evidence remains admissible in legal proceedings and maintains forensic validity.

Chain of custody documentation tracks who handled the evidence, when it was accessed, how it was stored, and what actions were performed. This aligns directly with forensic compliance principles, which require proper evidence preservation, documentation, and controlled handling procedures.

While restoring systems, responders must ensure that backup media and affected systems are handled in a way that does not compromise evidence. ECIH emphasizes that recovery should not destroy or contaminate forensic artifacts that may be required for legal, regulatory, or disciplinary action.

Option B (Network segmentation) relates to containment strategies. Option C (Immutable infrastructure) refers to architectural resilience models. Option D (Enhanced authentication) concerns access control, not evidence handling.

Therefore, Logan is adhering to forensic compliance principles during recovery.

Incident triage is the stage in the incident response process where the incident handler, like Mike, performs an initial assessment of the reported incident to determine its validity, severity, and potential impact. This includes analyzing the incident to verify if it is a genuine threat or a false positive. The purpose of incident triage is to prioritize incidents based on their criticality and ensure that resources are allocated effectively to address the most serious threats first. This stage is crucial for efficient incident management, as it helps in filtering out false alarms and focusing on real security incidents that require immediate attention.

Malicious downloads initiated through manipulated office documents typically involve macro abuse. Macros are scripts that can automate tasks within documents and are embedded within Office documents like Word, Excel, and PowerPoint files. While macros can be used for legitimate purposes, they can also be abused by attackers to execute malicious code. When an office document with a malicious macro is opened, and macros are enabled, the macro can run arbitrary code that leads to malicious downloads, installing malware or performing other unauthorized actions on the victim's system.

Macro abuse has become a common vector for cyber attacks, as it exploits the functionality of widely used office applications. Attackers often craft phishing emails with attachments or links to documents that contain malicious macros, tricking users into enabling macros to execute the malicious code. This method is effective for bypassing some security measures since it relies on user interaction and exploitation of legitimate features.

For memory dump analysis, tools like Scylla and OllyDumpEx are more suited. These tools are designed to analyze and extract information from memory dumps, which can be crucial for understanding the state of a system at the time of an incident. Scylla is used for reconstructing imports in dumped binaries, while OllyDumpEx is an OllyDbg plugin used for dumping process memory. Both tools are valuable for incident handlers like Rinni who are performing memory dump analysis to uncover evidence or understand the behavior of malicious software.

A Trojan, short for Trojan horse, is a type of malicious software that misleads users of its true intent. It disguises itself as a legitimate and useful program, but once executed, it allows unauthorized access to the user's system. Unlike viruses and worms, Trojans do not replicate themselves but can be just as destructive. They are often used to create a backdoor to a computer system, allowing an attacker to gain access to the system or to deliver other malware. Trojans can be used for a variety of purposes, including stealing information, downloading or uploading files, monitoring the user's screen and keyboard, and more. The term "Trojan" comes from the Greek story of the wooden horse that was used to sneak soldiers into the city of Troy, which is analogous to the deceptive nature of this type of malware in cyber security.

This scenario directly reflects crime scene documentation and physical reconstruction, a core principle in the Forensic Readiness and First Response module of the ECIH curriculum. First responders must assume that every physical detail may later become relevant in court proceedings or advanced forensic reconstruction.

Option A is correct because Tara’s actions—photographing cable connections, labeling ports, documenting power states, and noting spatial orientation—are explicitly designed to allow investigators to recreate the original physical environment. ECIH emphasizes that improper documentation of physical layout can invalidate conclusions about device usage, peripheral connections, or data paths.

Option B is incorrect because uptime continuity is not her objective. Option C refers to live system analysis, which she is not performing. Option D applies to digital evidence integrity after acquisition, not scene documentation.

ECIH stresses that physical reconstruction references are especially important in insider threat investigations, where proving who had access, which devices were connected, and how data could have been transferred is critical. Tara’s approach ensures forensic soundness, minimizes contamination risk, and preserves contextual evidence.

When malware moves from the delivery stage to the exploitation stage in the cyber kill chain, its objective often shifts to identifying exploitable vulnerabilities within the targeted system. A port scan is a technique used to discover services that are listening on ports within a system. By scanning the system's ports, the malware can identify open ports and the services running on them, providing valuable information about potential entry points for further exploitation. This type of reconnaissance attack is aimed at gathering intelligence on the target system's network services, which can then be reported back to a command and control center for further malicious activity planning.

Port scanning is more relevant than IP range sweeps, packet sniffing, or session hijacking for identifying useful services on a system because it directly targets the discovery of accessible network services and their corresponding ports. While the other methods can also be part of the reconnaissance phase, they serve different purposes: IP range sweeps aim to identify active IP addresses, packet sniffing intercepts data packets to gather information, and session hijacking involves taking over a valid user session. In contrast, port scanning is specifically designed to enumerate services that could be exploited.

ECIH email incident response guidance emphasizes email header analysis as the primary validation technique for suspected spoofing or impersonation attacks.

Option A is correct because headers reveal sender IPs, routing paths, and authentication results (SPF, DKIM, DMARC). This evidence directly confirms whether the email originated from a legitimate source.

Options B, C, and D are supplementary actions but do not provide authoritative validation.

This scenario involves an active cloud malware incident affecting operational systems. According to the ECIH cloud incident handling process, the priority after detection is containment and eradication using appropriate tooling. Cloud-specific security tools provide visibility into workloads, API activity, lateral movement, and malicious persistence mechanisms unique to cloud environments.

Option B is correct because deploying the cloud security tool enables identification of infected resources, malicious processes, compromised identities, and abnormal API usage. This allows responders to contain spread, remove malware, and restore integrity without unnecessary disruption.

Option A is an extreme business decision that could cause severe operational and financial damage and should only occur if safety is directly threatened. Option C is a communication step that must be based on verified impact. Option D is monitoring, not response.

ECIH emphasizes that incident response actions must be proportional, evidence-based, and targeted. Leveraging cloud-native or cloud-aware security tools is the most effective primary response in such incidents, making Option B correct.

The EC-Council Incident Handler (ECIH) curriculum highlights the importance of proactive security controls, asset management, configuration management, and vulnerability management as foundational elements of forensic readiness and incident prevention.

The scenario describes challenges related to unmanaged systems, inconsistent configurations, and lack of asset visibility—core issues addressed by the CIS Critical Security Controls (CIS CSC). The CIS Controls provide prioritized, actionable cybersecurity best practices designed to mitigate the most common attack vectors. These include inventory and control of hardware assets, inventory and control of software assets, secure configuration of enterprise assets, continuous vulnerability management, and controlled use of administrative privileges.

ECIH emphasizes that organizations must first establish visibility into assets and enforce baseline security configurations to reduce attack surfaces. The CIS framework is specifically designed for practical implementation, making it ideal for organizations seeking efficient deployment using available resources.

Option B (NIST 800-61) focuses on incident response lifecycle management, not proactive exposure reduction. Option C (ITIL) focuses on IT service management and service restoration, not cybersecurity hardening. Option D (COBIT) provides high-level governance and enterprise control objectives but does not offer the hands-on, prioritized technical safeguards described in the scenario.

Therefore, consistent with ECIH guidance on preventive controls and security baselining, the CIS Critical Security Controls framework is the best fit for implementing proactive, real-world defensive measures.

IDOR is fundamentally an authorization flaw: the application exposes object identifiers (IDs) and fails to enforce that the requesting user is allowed to access that object. The primary remediation is to implement robust authorization checks—commonly RBAC (C) plus object-level access control—so every request verifies user identity and privileges against the requested resource.

(A) WAFs can help with certain injection patterns, but default WAF rules rarely fix logical authorization flaws like IDOR. A WAF also risks false positives and doesn’t replace secure design. (B) pen testing is important for assurance, but it’s not the primary patch; it helps validate the fix later. (D) encryption protects confidentiality in transit/at rest, but it does not prevent an authenticated user from accessing another user’s records if authorization checks are missing.

Therefore (C) is the correct first-line fix: enforce authorization server-side, avoid predictable identifiers, and ensure access control is consistently applied across all endpoints (including APIs).

BinText is a lightweight text extraction tool that can be used to perform string search analysis within binary files. This functionality is crucial for incident handlers like Jason, who are tasked with analyzing memory dumps for malicious activity or indicators of compromise. By searching for specific strings or patterns that are known to be associated with malware, BinText helps in identifying potentially harmful actions that a program could perform, thus aiding in the investigation of malware incidents.

Email Dossier is a tool designed to assist in the investigation of email incidents by analyzing and validating email headers and providing detailed information about the origin, routing, and authenticity of an email. When Michael is tasked with handling an email incident and needs to check the validity of an email received from an unknown source, Email Dossier can be utilized to trace the email's path, assess its credibility, and identify potential red flags associated with phishing or other malicious email-based attacks.

This scenario involves a suspected malicious insider threat with potential external collusion, which significantly elevates legal, regulatory, and evidentiary requirements. The ECIH curriculum emphasizes that when insider activity is suspected—especially involving terminated employees and possible corporate espionage—organizations must prioritize forensic integrity, confidentiality, and lawful investigation.

Option B is correct because collaborating with external forensic experts and law enforcement ensures a neutral, legally defensible investigation. ECIH stresses that insider cases often require specialized forensic capabilities, evidence preservation, and legal authority that internal teams alone may not possess. Maintaining confidentiality protects the organization from reputational damage and legal exposure while facts are being established.

Option A ignores the insider dimension and risks repeat incidents. Option C bypasses legal safeguards and could be interpreted as obstruction or collusion. Option D is premature and exposes the organization to defamation and legal risk without substantiated evidence.

ECIH guidance is clear that complex insider incidents should be escalated appropriately with legal and forensic rigor. Therefore, Option B aligns best with recommended practice.

Explanation (OT/IoT incident handling):

For smart grid and IoT/OT environments, the first step is to activate the dedicated incident response process that prioritizes safety and continuity while isolating affected components. Immediate shutdown (A) can create operational and safety consequences and should be reserved for clear safety threats. Firmware updates (B) are risky during an active incident; updating can brick devices, change system states, and destroy evidence while not guaranteeing removal of compromise. Third-party engagement (D) can help, but it’s not the first operational step—your internal playbook must begin containment now.

(C) correctly focuses on isolating affected devices/segments, limiting lateral movement, and preserving operational stability. In practice, this can include network segmentation, blocking suspicious outbound communications, switching to manual controls where necessary, and capturing logs/telemetry before making changes. This aligns with common containment strategy: stop spread first, then analyze/eradicate, then recover with validated clean states.

Logging User IDs (D) can pose privacy concerns and may conflict with regulations such as the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR), which emphasizes the protection of personal data and privacy. Therefore, while logging details such as Timestamps, Session IDs, and Source IP addresses are essential for security auditing to track when events occur, who is initiating sessions, and from where, care must be taken with User IDs. The handling of personally identifiable information (PII) must comply with privacy laws and organizational policies to safeguard individual privacy rights.

This scenario demonstrates preservation of volatile evidence, a critical first-response principle in the ECIH forensic readiness module. Volatile evidence includes data that exists only while a system is powered on, such as active sessions, running processes, open files, and on-screen information.

Option B is correct because David documents the live system state without interacting in a way that would alter evidence. Photographing the screen, recording visible activity, and documenting connections are all recommended ECIH practices when dealing with powered-on systems.

Option A is unrelated. Option C alters system state. Option D applies only to inactive devices.

ECIH stresses that mishandling active systems can destroy crucial evidence. David’s actions align precisely with first responder best practices, making Option B correct.

The EC-Council Incident Handler (ECIH) curriculum explains that insider data exfiltration frequently occurs through legitimate channels such as HTTPS to bypass traditional firewall rules. When encrypted traffic is not inspected, sensitive data can be transmitted without detection.

Data Loss Prevention (DLP) tools monitor, detect, and block unauthorized transmission of sensitive information across endpoints, networks, and cloud services. DLP solutions can inspect encrypted traffic (when integrated with SSL/TLS inspection mechanisms) and enforce policies that prevent confidential data from leaving the organization.

The absence of deep packet inspection allowed encrypted HTTPS traffic to evade detection. Implementing DLP would provide content-aware monitoring and policy-based enforcement, reducing insider exfiltration risk.

Option A (biometric authentication) controls access, not outbound data flows. Option C (secure coding) relates to software development security. Option D (USB blocking) addresses removable media exfiltration, not encrypted network traffic.

Therefore, implementing Data Loss Prevention (DLP) tools is the appropriate eradication control.

The Microsoft Baseline Security Analyzer (MBSA) is a tool designed to assess a computer or network's security state by checking for missing security updates and common security misconfigurations. In the scenario with Finn, who is working in the eradication phase of an incident response process, the use of MBSA makes sense. The tool's ability to detect missing security patches and recommend the installation of the latest patches is crucial for eliminating vulnerabilities in the Windows operating system that could be the root cause of the incident.

MBSA scans the system for missing security updates, misconfigurations, and other vulnerabilities and provides detailed reports and recommendations for remediation. This step is vital in the eradication phase, where the goal is to remove the root causes of the incident and secure the system against future attacks. By ensuring that all necessary patches are applied, Finn is addressing any security gaps that could be exploited by attackers.

Incident triage is the phase in the incident handling and response process where identified security incidents are analyzed, validated, categorized, and prioritized. This step is critical for determining the severity of incidents and deciding on the allocation of resources for effective response. It involves initial analysis to understand the nature of the incident, its impact, and urgency, which guides the subsequent response actions.

This scenario highlights violations of forensic readiness and safe malware handling, which are explicitly covered in the ECIH First Response and Malware Analysis modules. ECIH stresses that malware samples must never be handled on production or enterprise-connected systems, as this creates a high risk of accidental execution, lateral infection, and organizational impact.

Option A is correct because ECIH mandates that malicious code samples be stored in isolated, non-networked environments and renamed with non-executable extensions (for example, .malware, .bin, or .txt) to prevent accidental execution. This practice ensures operational safety and preserves forensic integrity.

Option B improves confidentiality but does not prevent accidental execution. Option C supports documentation but does not mitigate execution risk. Option D aids classification but does not address safe handling.

The described behavior—handling live malware on enterprise systems without isolation or renaming—directly contradicts ECIH best practices. Proper sample isolation, renaming, and access restriction are mandatory controls to prevent secondary incidents during investigations, making Option A the correct answer.

This scenario describes an active exploitation of a vulnerable application feature. The ECIH Web Application Incident Handling module emphasizes that when a specific feature is being abused, immediate containment requires removing or disabling that attack surface.

Option B is correct because disabling the vulnerable advanced search feature immediately stops further exploitation while allowing the team to analyze and remediate the flaw safely. ECIH warns against leaving known-vulnerable functionality active during investigation.

Options A and C improve authentication but do not stop exploitation of backend logic. Option D protects stored data but does not prevent further abuse.

Therefore, disabling the exploited feature is the best immediate action.

The EC-Council Incident Handler (ECIH) curriculum explains that certain advanced mobile malware strains embed themselves as background services configured to restart automatically upon reboot. In such cases, traditional antivirus scans may fail to fully remove the threat because the malicious service remains active.

Switching the mobile device to safe mode (or emergency mode) prevents third-party applications and background services from automatically launching during startup. This isolates the malicious process and prevents it from reinitializing, allowing responders to perform forensic analysis and removal without triggering additional payload execution or data exfiltration.

ECIH emphasizes that during malware eradication, responders must prevent the malware from executing while conducting cleanup procedures. Safe mode supports controlled analysis and minimizes risk during remediation.

Option B (lost device tracking) is a monitoring measure, not an eradication technique. Option C (revoking cloud permissions) is relevant to access control but does not remove embedded malware. Option D (network scans) supports broader investigation but does not directly eliminate the persistent mobile threat.

ECIH guidance for malware eradication includes isolating infected devices, disabling malicious processes, applying clean firmware or OS reinstallation if necessary, and ensuring persistence mechanisms are removed. Therefore, switching the phone to safe mode before cleanup is the most appropriate eradication step.

The Sarbanes–Oxley Act (SOX) Title V, titled "Analyst Conflicts of Interest," contains measures specifically designed to restore investor confidence in the reporting of securities analysts. It addresses the issue of potential conflicts of interest for securities analysts who recommend stocks and other securities by requiring disclosure of certain relationships and financial interests between analysts and the companies they cover. This part of the SOX Act aims to ensure that investors receive unbiased and accurate information from analysts, thereby helping to restore trust in financial markets. Title V consists of only one section, making it unique compared to other titles within the Act that may encompass multiple sections or provisions.

One of the key approaches to mitigating insider threats is ensuring that access control policies are strictly implemented and monitored. This includes the guideline that access granted to users should be thoroughly documented and vetted by a supervisor. This control helps ensure that users have only the access necessary to perform their job functions, reducing the risk of inappropriate access or misuse of information. Proper documentation and supervisor approval also ensure accountability and traceability of access decisions, which is crucial for detecting and responding to insider threats. The human resources department plays a vital role in this process, working closely with IT and security teams to enforce access control policies, conduct regular reviews of access rights, and manage the onboarding and offboarding process to ensure that access rights are appropriately updated.

Live data acquisition is the process of collecting volatile data from a system that is still running. Volatile data includes information stored in system memory (RAM), cache, and system and network configuration settings that are lost when the system is powered off. This method is essential for capturing data that can provide insights into the state of the system at the time of an incident, including active network connections, running processes, and the contents of memory. Marley must employ live data acquisition to ensure that this crucial and ephemeral data is not lost, which can be pivotal in understanding and responding to the incident effectively.

Employee monitoring tools are primarily used by employers to detect and prevent malicious insider threats. These tools can track activities such as data access, data exfiltration attempts, unauthorized actions, and other behaviors that could indicate malicious intent or pose a risk to the organization's security. While such tools may also incidentally uncover issues like lost registry keys, conspiracies, or stolen credentials, their main purpose is to safeguard against insiders who might misuse their access to harm the organization, steal data, sabotage systems, or engage in espionage.

The EC-Council Incident Handler (ECIH) curriculum stresses that mobile malware often enters enterprise environments through sideloaded applications obtained from untrusted sources. Android devices that allow installation from unknown sources significantly increase organizational risk.

Mobile Device Management (MDM) solutions are recommended to enforce application control policies, including restricting installations to digitally signed applications from approved app stores. By enforcing signed app installation policies, organizations prevent the execution of tampered or malicious APK files.

Option A (remote tracking) assists with lost device recovery but does not prevent malicious installations. Option B (Bluetooth/NFC restriction) addresses wireless communication risks, not app integrity. Option C (full-disk encryption) protects stored data but does not stop malware from executing.

ECIH guidance highlights enforcing mobile security baselines, restricting unknown sources, implementing application whitelisting, and applying MDM-enforced controls to prevent sideloaded malware infections. Therefore, enforcing MDM policies that allow only signed app installations is the most effective preventive control.

ECIH forensic readiness guidance stresses that forensic imaging with hash verification is the gold standard for preserving evidence integrity. Option B is correct because it ensures data integrity, authenticity, and non-repudiation.

Creating a bit-by-bit forensic image preserves original evidence while allowing analysis on copies. Hash verification confirms that no alterations occur during acquisition or transport. Encrypted storage protects confidentiality, and detailed logs support chain of custody.

Options A, C, and D lack one or more critical forensic requirements such as hash validation or evidentiary isolation. ECIH explicitly warns against relying solely on physical transport or live data transfers.

Incapsula is a cloud-based application delivery platform that offers a comprehensive security solution, including protection against Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) attacks. By providing DDoS mitigation services, Incapsula helps protect websites and online services from being overwhelmed by traffic intended to make the resource unavailable to its intended users. The platform filters out malicious traffic and allows legitimate traffic through, thus ensuring that the organization's online resources remain available even under attack.

The term that describes the combination of strategies and services intended to restore data, applications, and other resources to the public cloud or dedicated service providers is "Cloud recovery." This term encompasses disaster recovery efforts focused on ensuring that an organization's digital assets can be quickly and effectively restored or moved to cloud environments in the event of data loss, system failure, or a disaster. Cloud recovery strategies are part of a broader disaster recovery and business continuity planning, ensuring minimal downtime and data loss by leveraging cloud computing's scalability and flexibility. Mitigation, analysis, and eradication are terms associated with other aspects of incident response and risk management, not specifically with the restoration of resources to cloud environments.

Process memory, or volatile memory (RAM), is digital evidence that requires a constant power supply to retain data and is deleted or lost when the power supply is interrupted. It contains information about the system's ongoing processes and operations. This type of evidence can be crucial for forensic investigations as it may hold information about user actions, system events, and the state of applications and services at the time of an incident. Unlike swap files, event logs, and slack space, which can retain information without a constant power supply, process memory is inherently volatile and its contents are lost when a device is powered off or restarts.

According to the ECIH Risk Assessment and Recovery module, neutralizing the vulnerability is the top priority during active exploitation, even in nation-state scenarios.

Option C is correct because immediately patching and deploying updates removes the attacker’s access vector and prevents further compromise. ECIH discourages counter-hacking and premature disclosure without containment.

Options A and B may follow after stabilization. Option D is illegal and prohibited.

Therefore, rapid patching is the correct primary action.

Access point monitoring is the technique that helps incident handlers to detect man-in-the-middle (MitM) attacks by continuously observing and managing the wireless access points (APs) within a network. This includes identifying unauthorized or new APs attempting to connect to the network or mimic existing APs, even if they present similar IP and MAC addresses to legitimate access points. Through access point monitoring, incident handlers can quickly identify and mitigate spoofed APs, thus preventing MitM attacks that exploit wireless networks by intercepting and manipulating communications.

ISO/IEC 27002 is a standard that provides best practice recommendations on information security controls for use by those responsible for initiating, implementing, or maintaining information security management systems (ISMSs). It covers areas such as risk assessment, human resource security, operational security, and communications security, among others, providing a framework for establishing, implementing, operating, monitoring, reviewing, maintaining, and improving an ISMS. ISO/IEC 27035 pertains to information security incident management, PCI DSS (Payment Card Industry Data Security Standard) deals with the security of cardholder data, and RFC 2196 is a guide for computer security incident response teams (CSIRTs), not a standard for implementing ISMSs.